Nazi Racism Toward the Japanese

Ideology vs. Realpolitik

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Introduction*

Racism is a powerful expressive form that combines all three stereotyping mechanisms: it draws boundaries that per definition are insurmountable, it imposes a homogenizing set of defining characteristics on a group, and it also always involves evaluation, which is on the basis of these group characteristics.1

Ever since the age of expansion in the sixteenth century, racism toward the Japanese in the form of both idolizing and contemptuous attitudes has existed in the German populace. However, it was only at the end of the nineteenth century

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that racism toward the Japanese emerged clearly on the political level. Following the Triple Intervention at the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) when Wilhelmine Germany, Russia and France forced victorious Japan to surrender the Peninsula of Liaotung, Wilhelm II introduced a racial element in his Weltpolitik: the „yellow peril,“ or die gelbe Gefahr. Although this term would be used to describe a fear of the „yellow race“ in general, it was aimed in 1895 at the Japanese in the international context of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War. Wary of Japanese progress, Wilhelm commissioned the artist Knackfuss in 1895 to work on a picture entitled „The Yellow Peril“ from his own design of a togaed European, with the Archangel Michael behind him, resisting a Buddha – a symbol of barbarism and heathenism – sitting on flaming clouds across the sea. Impressed with the result, he ordered all ships of the Hamburg-America and Norddeutscher Lloyed lines to hang a copy of it on board. 2

The „yellow peril“ directed against the Japanese had a definite political use for Wilhelm II who wanted to keep Russia preoccupied in the Far East in order to obtain a freer hand along Germany's eastern borders. 3 In one of the famous „Willy to Nicky“ letters, the Kaiser wrote to Tsar Nicholas II:

To guard the rear of Russia I shall certainly do all in my power to keep Europe quiet, and also so that nobody shall hamper your action towards the Far East. For that is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the Asian continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great yellow race. In this you will always find me on your side, ready to help you as best as I can. 4

Evidently, the „yellow peril“ was a racism initially created and tailored to serve the aims of the Wilhelmine Weltpolitik.

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Racial ideas had therefore existed in Germany when the notorious racist regime of Adolf Hitler emerged in January 1933. However, one must clearly distinguish Nazi racism toward the Japanese from the centuries-old racial images and the more current „yellow peril,“ since the new racism existed in the context of Hitler's staunch racism toward all non-Aryans. According to Hitler's racial hierarchy, the Japanese were clearly non-Aryans, and therefore „inferior“ to the „Aryan race,“ yet „superior“ to Jews and Gypsies. Furthermore, unlike Wilhelmine racism, which was of an auxiliary importance and had its primary use in Germany's Weltpolitik, Hitler's racial ideology formed the central pillar of the

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3 Iklé, „Japan's Policies“ 280.

This thesis will focus on Nazi racism toward the Japanese and its implications for German-Japanese relations in the 1930s. How could the racist Nazis form an alliance with the Japanese who were clearly non-Aryans? Did the Nazis racially discriminate against the Japanese in reality? What implications did Nazi racism toward all non-Aryans have for their relations specifically with Japan? Conversely, to what extent did their alliance with Japan necessitate a compromise in their racism?

To be sure, Nazi racism toward the Japanese was negligible compared to Nazi anti-Semitism. Also, Nazi racism did not outrage the Japanese to the extent that they opted to nullify their alliance with Germany. Far from it, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936, Cultural Pact in November 1938, and Axis Agreement in September 1940.

Nevertheless, the German-Japanese alliance was a convenient, opportunistic one without sincere commitments on both sides. The hollowness of the bilateral alliance in military, diplomatic, and/or economic realms, has been stated by German, Japanese, and American experts on German-Japanese relations in the 1930s – Kurt Bloch, John Fox, Frank Iklé, Erich Kordt, Gerhard Krebs, Hans-Joachim Krug, Bernd Martin, Johanna Meskill, Masaki Miyake, Ernst Presseisen and Tajima Nobuo, to name a few. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the Japanese-Russian Pact of 1941 serve as typical examples of betrayals on both sides. Many historians would further agree with Johanna Meskill's statement that the German-Japanese alliance was not even a „marriage of convenience,” but rather „a long and uneasy engagement, maintained long past the hope of eventual union, not because the partners had be come com-

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6 Bloch has focused his analysis on the economic cooperation (or lack thereof), Krug on the military cooperation, while other historians mentioned above have examined the overall German-Japanese relations throughout the 1930s and during the war, with an emphasis on diplomacy. Tajima has done a comprehensive analysis of the clashing of German and Japanese interests in Manchukuo. See the bibliography for the titles of specific works by these historians.

7 Erich KORDT, German Political History in the Far East during the Hitler Regime, an unpublished manuscript. Nürnberg: May 1946. Trans., and ed. by E.A. Bayne. (U.S. Department of State) 22, 36.
fortably used to each other, but because breaking the engagement would have reduced the prestige of each in the neighborhood."8

While historians have thus examined various military, diplomatic, and economic frictions in the German-Japanese relations in the 1930s and during the war, most have ignored one of the major causes of distrust between the two countries: Nazi racism toward the Japanese. Given the fact that Nazi racial ideology formed the basis of the Nazi regime, it would seem absolutely essential to study Nazi racism toward the Japanese in order to understand the fragility of the German-Japanese alliance. Moreover, one must take into account the heightened sensitivity of the Japanese to any racism that came from the „whites.” It was Japan which requested a declaration of racial equality to be incorporated into the covenant of the League of Nations at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 – which was denied by the „white“ Europeans and Americans.9 In addition, racial discrimination against Japanese-Americans in the United States, especially on the West Coast, contributed to the deterioration of Japanese-American relations prior to the 1930s.10 Given that „race“ was an extremely delicate issue for the Japanese, one can imagine how sensitive they could be to Nazi racism which aggressively proclaimed the superiority of the „Aryan race.“ Thus, while Nazi racism did not force Japan to renounce its alliance with Germany, it surely heightened the level of mutual distrust and thereby worked to weaken the bilateral relations.

While inquiries by John Fox, Eberhard Friese, Gerhard Krebs, Bernd Martin, Masaki Miyake, and Ernst Presseisen serve as enlightening introductions to Nazi racism toward the Japanese and its consequences for the bilateral relations, they are discouragingly brief and general. John Fox's ten-page analysis in Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931–193811 is perhaps the most detailed study ever done on this topic. While Fox has brought to light some interesting evidence of Nazi sensitivity to Japan's outrage at Nazi racism, he stops short of examining actual racial discrimination against the Japanese in Germany. Most recently in 1991, history student Nami Ohtomo skillfully explored actual instances of racial discrimination against Japanese-Germans in her undergraduate thesis for East Asians Studies at Harvard University. However, she presented only a brief survey of fifteen pages on selected case studies found in a file of the German-Japanese Society (Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft) stored at the German National Archives in Koblenz.

This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the study of Nazi racism toward the Japanese, primarily by analyzing documents found in the German Foreign Ministry in Bonn, the German National Archives in Koblenz and Potsdam, the Institute for Research on Antisemitism in Berlin, and the Archives at the University of Heidelberg. Despite Gerhard Kreb’s professional warning that one “will not find sufficient material on Nazi policy toward Japanese residents to fill one hundred pages,” dozens of files which refer, though mostly in bits and pieces, to Nazi racism toward the Japanese and its negative implications for Germany’s relations with Japan were found in the major German archives. Several files had such specific titles as “Repercussions of German racial policy on its foreign relations,” “The Japanese press,” and “Race questions: general information as well as treatment of individual cases of German-Japanese mixed offspring.” Although fragments of information extracted from various files in the archives do not allow one to draw definite conclusions, they nevertheless offer invaluable insights into actual instances of racial discrimination and the negative consequences of Nazi racism on the German-Japanese relations in the 1930s.

This study begins with an examination of Nazi racism toward the Japanese as expressed by Hitler and his close subordinate, Joseph Goebbels. Chapter Two focuses on Nazi racial laws regarding the Japanese. This chapter also reveals details about the interministerial debate on whether to legally subject Japanese to racial discrimination in Germany. Chapter Three examines the application of the racial laws to the Japanese by bringing to light more than two-dozen instances of racial discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent and their spouses in Germany. The principal source for these case studies is file No. 31 of the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft (DJG) at the German National Archives in Koblenz. The DJG, which was founded in 1890 to educate the German public on Japan and promote cultural ties between the two countries, acted as an intermediary between the Japanese or Japanese-German victims of discrimination and the Nazi regime throughout the 1930s. In addition to the DJG documents, several files in the German Foreign Ministry and files of the Party Chancellery (stored in microfilms at the Institute for Research on Antisemitism) provide valuable, supplementary information on the cases mentioned by the DJG and disclose several new cases. Also, secondary sources, as well as personal interviews with a Japanese individual who experienced discrimination and several other Japanese citizens who lived in Germany in the 1930s, complement the study of actual racial discrimination against the Japanese. Both Chapters Two and Three reveal the Nazis’ dilemma: to what extent should they compromise

13 “Rückwirkung der deutschen Rassenpolitik auf die Beziehungen zu fremden Staaten” and „Pressewesen in Japan“ are in the German Foreign Ministry (AA), and „Rassenfragen. Allgemeines sowie die Behandlung von Einzelfällen deutsch-japanischer „Blutmischungen““ is in the German National Archives (BA Kobl).
their racial ideology to accommodate realpolitik – their alliance with Japan? Furthermore, both chapters address Japanese reactions to Nazi racism toward all non-Aryans, and Nazi authorities' concern about negative diplomatic implications of their racism.

1. Hitler's Racism toward the Japanese

In order to understand Nazi racism toward the Japanese and the Nazi alliance with Japan, one must first examine the racial beliefs and attitudes toward Japan of Adolf Hitler.

In Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*, in the chapter called „Nations and Race,“ Hitler explained that if mankind were to be divided into three groups – culture-founders, culture-bearers, and culture-destroyers – only the Aryan would qualify for the first category. The Japanese would be culture-bearers for the following reasons:

> It is not the case, as some people claim, that Japan adds European techniques to her culture, but European science and techniques are trimmed with Japanese characteristics. But the basis of actual life is no longer the special Japanese culture but it is the enormous scientific and technical work of Europe and America, that is, of Aryan peoples. Based on these achievements alone the East is also able to follow general human progress ... But if, starting today, all further Aryan influence upon Japan should stop then the source [of a further development of Japan's present rise in science and technology] would dry out, ... its culture would stiffen and fall back into the sleep out of which it was startled seven decades ago by the Aryan wave of culture. ... the present Japanese development owes its life to Aryan origin ...¹⁵

Thus in Hitler's eyes, the Japanese, as a „race“, were clearly inferior to the Aryans. Presseisen mentions that the above words were expressed in Hitler's early days before his speeches were circumscribed by political expediency. Thus they may come closest to his genuine feelings.¹⁶

At the same time, Hitler identified with the Japanese on one essential point: both Germany and Japan, he thought, were victims of the Jewry. In the section called „Japan and Jewry“ in the chapter „German Policy of Alliance After the War,“ Hitler wrote:

> The Jew knows only too accurately that... he has it well within his power to undermine European peoples only he would hardly be in a position to subject an Asiatic national State like Japan to this fate ... He dreads a Japanese national State in his millennial Jew empire, and therefore wishes its destruction in advance of the founding of his own dictatorship.


Therefore, he is now inciting the nations against Japan, as against Germany . . .17

Also, according to William Kirby, the Japanese enjoyed a slightly higher standing than the Chinese in Hitler’s scale of racial value. Although both the Chinese and Japanese were „lesser races“ in Hitler’s eyes, the Chinese were mentioned only at one point in Mein Kampf, „as the racial equal of Negroes.“18 Kirby further mentions:

Although the Japanese were said to owe their progress largely to „Aryan influence,“ the book [Mein Kampf] showed grudging admiration for the accomplishments of a Japanese state that had remained impervious to the machinations of „international Jewry“ and had so completely defeated Russia in 1904–5.19

Kirby’s statements as well as Hitler’s beliefs as expressed in Mein Kampf and other sources lead one to conclude that Hitler’s attitude toward the Japanese encompassed more than just plain racism. While there was no question that Hitler despised the Japanese as „racially inferior,“ he admired the Japanese state as an administrative unit. The irony was that these „racially inferior“ Japanese made and ran the „admirable“ Japanese state of which he was even envious.

Various excerpts from Hitler’s Secret Conversations attest to Hitler’s disdain for the Japanese „race.“ For instance, following the successful Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hitler said, „one must regret it for it’s the white race which is the loser.“20 Moreover on May 17, 1942, Hitler stated: „This war is one of life and death, and in order to win the war, we would even ally ourselves with the Devil.“21 In addition, Joseph Goebbels reported on May 8, 1943, that Hitler „sometimes asks himself in a worried sort of way whether the white man is going to be able in the long run to maintain his supremacy over the tremendous reservoir of human beings in the East.“22 Thus, Hitler clearly regarded the Japanese as racially inferior and perceived a threat in their success.

At the same time, Hitler made speeches and private remarks admiring the military prowess of the Japanese. On February 11, 1942, Goebbels wrote in his diary:

17 HITLER, Mein Kampf, 930–931. The editor notes: „The rivalry between Japan and Russia over „spheres of influence“ in China indicates to Hitler that Judaism [in Russia] is bent on undermining the healthy structure of the Japanese State. Japan was regarded by White Russians as a possible ally."
19 KIRBY 140.
The Führer has the greatest respect and highest praise for the way the Japanese are conducting the war. The Japanese deserve this. They are fighting so bravely and with such an enviable national idealism that one could only wish we had more such allies.  

Hitler was referring to the imminent Japanese victory against the British in Singapore, which would take place four days later on February 14. Japan's victory in Singapore was welcome news to Hitler, since he hoped that this victory would cause „a crisis for the British Empire.‟. However, on the very same day he made the aforementioned comment to Goebbels, he told a former president of Romania: „I rejoice, yet am terribly sad at the same time.‟ Apparently, Hitler's deep-rooted racism did not allow him to heartily welcome successes of the „racially inferior‟ Japanese.

Furthermore, the former ambassador to Italy and anti-Nazi Ulrich von Hassell recorded on March 22, 1942 that Hitler was apparently not happy with the enormous successes of the Japanese army against the British, and that „he would rather send twenty army divisions to England to roll back the yellow race.‟ Therefore, while the Japanese victories in the Pacific were clearly welcomed as far as Germany's Realpolitik was concerned, Hitler could not heartily rejoice in any advances of „the yellow race.‟ Evidence of Hitler's seemingly contradictory reactions regarding the Japanese victory in Singapore shows that Hitler's admiration for Japanese achievements had no bearing whatsoever on his disdain and fearful, racial hatred of the Japanese.

The fact that the Nazis appreciated the Japanese solely for their military and political expediency emerges again in Goebbels' diary entry on March 23, 1942:

At the moment Oshima is engaged in clearing away a large number of misunderstandings prevalent in Tôkyô about conditions inside Germany. A monument ought later to be erected in his honor in Germany. To this man we chiefly owe the fact that Japan took a hand in the present conflict.

Hitler himself attributed the German-Japanese alliance to Japan's usefulness to Germany. In contesting accusations of „betrayal of our own racial principles,‟ Hitler stated:

23 GOEBBELS 79.
24 Hitler as cited in GOEBBELS 79.
25 Hitler as cited in Masaki MIYAKE „Hitorâ to Nihon‟ 164.
26 Von Hassell was ambassador to Italy from 1932 to 1938 when he was recalled from the embassy by the Nazi regime. Von Hassell was a staunch anti-Nazi: with von Stauffenberg, Goerdeler, and General Beck, he attempted an assassination on Hitler on July 20, 1944. He was executed in September 1944.
28 GOEBBELS 181. General Ôshima Hiroshi was the Japanese Ambassador to Germany at that time. He had been military attaché in Berlin in an earlier period.

... the Japanese alliance has been of exceptional value to us, if only because of the date chosen by Japan for her entry in the war. It was in effect, at the moment when the surprises of the Russian winter were pressing most heavily on the morale of our people, and when everybody in Germany was oppressed by the certainty that, sooner or later, the United States would come into the conflict. Japanese intervention, therefore, was, from our point of view, most opportune.30

Thus, Hitler's admiration for the Japanese state had to do solely with the utility value of Japan.

Often, Hitler's simultaneous appreciation and disdain for the capable yet „racially inferior“ ally gave rise to expressions of sarcastic, double-edged admiration with a tinge of envy. Goebbels wrote on February 14, 1942:

The Führer continues to have the greatest admiration for the Japs. They prepared everything secretly... Kurusu and Nomura negotiated in Washington without having the faintest idea as to what the Japanese war leaders were planning. ... When you are gambling for the existence of your own people you should employ all methods of a tricky and superior war strategy. It means, of course, that Kurusu and Nomura played an exceedingly ludicrous role, but that is of less importance.31

Also on March 4, 1942, Goebbels expressed his opinion on the Japanese government: „Japan is on the direct road toward an authoritarian regime camouflaged as parliamentary ... This form is suited to the Japanese mentality. “32 Although such comments might be construed as a compliment from the Nazis' perspective, a good dose of sarcasm seeps through these lines. Regarding Japanese propaganda, he wrote: „... the Japanese now and then exaggerate grossly ... their propaganda is very juvenile. “33

Therefore, Hitler's willingness to ally his regime with Japan for the purposes of Realpolitik by no means signified any compromise in his racial beliefs. The dictator, as well as his top aide Goebbels, continued to regard the Japanese as racially inferior.

2. Nazi Racial Laws and the Japanese

National Socialist racial doctrine was codified less than one month after the Nazis' victorious elections in March 1933. The „Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service“ (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamten-tums), which was declared on April 7, 1933, stated that those civil servants who

29 HITLER Conversations 123.
30 HITLER Conversations 396.
31 GOEBBELS 86. Kurusu had been Japanese Ambassador to Germany preceding his mission to Washington. Nomura was Ambassador to the United States.
32 GOEBBELS 204.
33 Entry, 2 February 1942. GOEBBELS 65.

NOAG 157-158 (1995)
were not able to prove their „Aryan descent“ – i.e. Germans of Jewish descent – must be dismissed.34

Following this initiative, there was a succession of laws in 1933 that excluded non-Aryans from posts such as jurors and patent lawyers, physicians in state social-insurance institutions, all government officials, tax advisors, honorary professors, university lecturers, and notaries, honorary officials in the field of social insurance, and dentists associated with state social-insurance institutions.35 Among many more others, the „Law Against the Overcrowding of German Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning“ (Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und Hochschulen) of April 25 limited the attendance of „non-Aryan“ Germans to a maximum of 5 percent. Moreover, the law of June 30, 1933 forbade the employment by government authorities of „non-Aryans“ or persons married to them.36 In September 1933, the Justice Ministry's Strafgesetzentwurf – a draft for the Criminal Law Reform – proposed the prohibition of sexual relations and of marriage between Aryans and non-Aryans.37

The key to these laws rested on the exact definition of the term „non-Aryan.“ A decree promulgated on April 11, 1933, defined a „non-Aryan“ as anyone „descended from non-Aryan, especially Jewish, parents or grandparents.“38 It further stated, „This is to be assumed especially if one parent or grandparent was of Jewish faith.“39 According to Wilhelm Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, people „of non-Aryan descent“ were those who had a non-Aryan grandpar-

38 Decree of 11 April 1933, as cited in DAWIDOWICZ 59. Emphasis is mine.
39 DAWIDOWICZ 59.
ent; the examination of racial roots went back to great-grandparents only when there was a need to assess the exact race proportions of grandparents.40

Therefore, the laws were primarily targeted at Jewish people; however, they did not explicitly exclude other „non-Aryans.“ The ambiguity of the term „of non-Aryan descent“ (nichtarischer Abstammung) in regard to Asian races caused serious anxieties on the part of the Japanese and Japanese-German people.

On October 11, 1933, Ambassador Nagai demanded clarification from the German Foreign Ministry on the official German stance on the Rassenproblem. Nagai warned Assistant Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Bernhard von Bülow, that German-Japanese relations would deteriorate if the Japanese ever came to be regarded as „colored,“ pointing to the racial discrimination against the Japanese in the United States and the ensuing bitter American-Japanese relations.

Von Bülow promised Nagai that the German government would prevent the use of offensive expressions and avoid misunderstandings on this issue.41 However, according to von Büllow's letter to the Minister of Justice on October 24, Ambassador Nagai came again nine days later, this time to see Foreign Minister von Neurath. Nagai asked the Foreign Minister whether the term „colored“ would apply to the Japanese and whether the draft for the Criminal Law Reforms would affect Japanese citizens.42 The Japanese sensitivity to this draft which amounted to a prohibition of marriages between Germans and people of „colored races“ was also mentioned in the telegram sent by the German Embassy in Tôkyô to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin on October 20.43 As for von Neurath's answer, according to The New York Times, the German Foreign Minister assured Japan that „the Japanese were not included among colored peoples“ and promised „to rectify the supposed inclusion of Japanese in measures prohibiting Germans from marrying Jews or „colored persons.‘“44

40 Frick's speech on 15 February 1934. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31, 68.
42 BA Pots: R 43 II/720a; 6. Also in AA: R99182; E257095.
43 „Gemeldetes Heiratsverbot Strafgesetzentwurf bezeichnet Presse als Beleidigung Japans.“ („Japanese Press describes the reported marriage prohibition in the Criminal Law draft as an insult to Japan.“) Telegram from Deutsche Botschaft (DB = German Embassy) Tôkyô to Auswärtiges Amt Berlin. 20 October 1933. As cited in letter von Bülow / MdJ. BA Pots: R 43 II/720a; 6.
44 „Reich Reassures Japan,“ a wireless to The NYT from Tôkyô. The New York Times 23 October 1933: 9 (column 2).
Neurath's statement was also published by *The Times of London* on October 24, according to historian John Fox.\(^45\)

However, less than one month after these assurances were given, Councillor Fujii of the Japanese Embassy came to the German-Japanese Society (Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft, or DJG)\(^46\) for further clarifications. On November 21, 1933, Fujii asked for a clear statement that the Japanese would not be considered non-Aryans. The conversation between Fujii and a DJG representative, as recorded by the latter, is a valuable source in that it reveals a series of speeches, laws, and instances of discrimination in Germany which provoked an outcry in Japan.\(^47\)

For example, Alfred Rosenberg, the Head of the Party's Central Department for Foreign Policy, emphasized the white race's struggle against the colored race in his speech at the Party Rally on September 2 in Nürnberg. Various Japanese newspapers, notably *Nihon*, *Hōchi Shimbun*, and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, published Rosenberg's speech under titles such as „The arrogant Nazis! The Chief of the Foreign Office pronounces hatred against the colored races!” and „Anti-Jews! Anti-Yellow Race!” say the Nazis.\(^48\) Moreover, Dr. Gercke, an expert on race

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\(^{45}\) *The Times* carried a report from Tôkyô, dated 23 October, stating that von Neurath had given the assurance that the Japanese were not considered „colored”, and „promised to rectify the supposed inclusion of the Japanese in the proposed legislation prohibiting Germans marrying Jews or coloured people.” FOX 86.

\(^{46}\) The DJG acted as spokesman for Japanese/Japanese-German individuals who faced racial discrimination under the Nazi regime. However, there was a clear limit to what the DJG could do. It even explicitly admitted their limit to a victim of discrimination in 1935: „We do not exercise direct influence upon the decisions of the proper authorities in any way.” („Eine direkte Einflussnahme auf die Entscheidung der zuständigen Stellen steht uns auf keinen Fall zu.”) In letter DJG / Wilhelm Hillenbrand, 21 December 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 173.

\(^{47}\) In „Besprechung mit Botschaftsrat Fujii am 21. November 1933 betreffend Rassenfrage.” („Discussion with Councillor Fujii on 21 November 1933, regarding the Race Question.”) BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 44–45. This entry does not specify with whom Councillor Fujii had this discussion. – According to John Fox, it was Admiral Paul Behncke, the President of the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft, who spoke with Councillor Fujii. (FOX 87) According to Annette Hack, it was Friedrich Hack, the German secretary of the DJG. (Annette HACK, „Ein verschwiegenes Tätigkeitsfeld: Die „Rasseakte” der DJG“ a manuscript for the book „Geschichte der DJG” [HAASCH 208ff.]. According to Harvard undergraduate thesis writer Nami Ohtomo, it was Generalmajor Faupel, which seems improbable, since Faupel was president of the Ibero-American Institute. (Nami OHTOMO, *Precarious Politics: German-Japanese Cultural Relations in the 1930s, A Study of Ideological Differences Between Two Allies* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard Archives, 1991] 63.)

\(^{48}\) In letter DB Tôkyô / AA Berlin, Re: „Der Japanische Botschafter in Berlin über die Rede Alfred Rosenbergs auf dem Parteitag der N.S.D.A.P.” („The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin regarding the speech by Alfred Rosenberg at the NSDAP Party day.”) 7 September 1933. AA: R85941 Abteilung Pol.IV 725/4 Akten „Pressewesen in Japan” („Press in Japan”) Bd.3, Jan. 1932–Dec. 1934. Here is an excerpt from Rosenberg’s speech as was cited in this letter: „We recognize the right to self-determination of the yellow race, … We do not desire a Europeanization of the
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questions in the Interior Ministry, admitted in October 1933 at the insistence of Japanese journalists that the Japanese were indeed a „colored race.“ The journalists telegraphed this report, which caused „a strong unrest“ in the Japanese public, according to Fujii.

In addition, Councillor Fujii mentioned several instances of racial discrimination against Japanese and Japanese-German individuals. Two cases among them were also documented in other files of the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft and at the German Foreign Ministry. They were the first publicized incidents of actual discrimination against people of Japanese descent in Germany, and provoked protests in the Japanese community in Germany and in Japan.

The first instance of discrimination involved a member of the Biologische Reichsanstalt für Land- und Forstwirtschaft (Institute of Biology for Agriculture and Forestry), Dr. Otto Urhan, who was dismissed on May 18, 1933 because his mother was Japanese. According to Councillor Fujii, Dr. Urhan's case was „passionately discussed by the Japanese press … Various Japanese companies have offered him employment in Japan.“ Indeed, an article in Nichi Nichi Shimbun on July 20, 1933 demanded an examination of this affair by the German government, since the incident „touches on the honor of the colored races, especially of the Japanese people.“ On July 21, Osaka Mainichi, too, harshly criticized the Reich's dismissal of Dr. Urhan in an article entitled „Japanese Blood is Reason For Nazis' Ousting of Capable German Scientist.“ The urgency to deal with this case was revealed in Dr. Solf's letter addressed to Dr. Köpke, the Ministerial Director at the Foreign Ministry, on July 16 – four days before the news broke in Japan. Dr. Solf, a former ambassador to yellow race, … and we fight against the mixing of races with all our might.“ („Wir erkennen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der gelben Rasse an, … Wir wünschen nicht die Europäisierung der gelben Rasse, … und wir bekämpfen mit allen Kräften eine Vermischung der Rassen.“)

49 In letter from the Director of the Institute, Dr. Appel, to Dr. Urhan. 18 May 1933. BA Kobl: R 46 IV/31; 44–45; also 91.

50 „Dieser Fall ist in der japanischen Presse ausführlich und teilweise leidenschaftlich besprochen worden. Verschiedene japanische Gesellschaften haben Dr. Urhan eine Stellung in Japan angeboten.“ BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 44.


52 „Da aber die Angelegenheit als solche die Ehre der färbigen Rasse, insbesondere die des japanischen Volkes, berührt, wird sie voraussichtlich bei sich bietender Gelegenheit, von der Deutschen Regierung eine Nachprüfung der Angelegenheit verlangen.“ „Die rasend gewordenen Nazis verstossen einen Beamten, der eine Japanerin als Mutter hat. Dr. Urhan in Not,“ („The Frenzied Nazis Expel a Man whose Mother is Japanese. Dr. Urhan in Difficulty,“) Nichi Nichi Shimbun, 20 July 1933. Translated and cited in German in letter DB Tôkyô / AA Berlin, 21 July 1933. AA: R85941.


Japan under the Weimar Republic, had apparently asked Japanese journalists to hold on to their telegrams and asked Councillor Fujii to do everything possible to prevent the affair from becoming sensational in Japan – for fear that Germans in Japan might become targets of reprisals.\footnote{Ich habe die beiden Journalisten gebeten, ein Telegramm hinterherzuschicken und die Veröffentlichung des Berichts zu stoppen. Ausserdem habe ich den Botschaftsrat Fujii gebeten, alles zu tun, um zu verhüten, dass die Sache sensationell in die japanische Presse kommt. ... nach der Mentalität der Japanese bin ich der festen Überzeugung, dass in der Presse vorgeschlagen wird, an den Deutschen in Japan Repressalien zu üben.\textsuperscript{54} Solf's letter to Dr. Köpke, 16 July 1933. BA Kobl: Nachlass 1053 Solf, Nr.93 (hereafter NL Solf/93); 18–19.}

As we have seen, the Japanese press – at least the \textit{Nichi Nichi} and \textit{Ôsaka Mainichi} – did not „cooperate“ with Solf. Despite all these upheavals, Dr. Urhan's case remained unresolved when Councillor Fujii complained to the DJG four months later on November 21.

The second publicized discrimination case, which took place in Berlin in October 1933, involved the nine year-old daughter of Dr. Takenouchi, a sales representative of the Sumitomo Group. According to Councillor Fujii, the girl was insulted and eventually hit by other children on her way to school because she was „colored.“\footnote{Zu ni noru Nachisu: Nihonjin wo bujoku shi dasu – yûshokujin sabetsu no mutai na hôan, \textit{Asahi Shim bun}, 20 October 1933: 1. „Hôjin bujoku jiken ni dokugaisô shakumei: Nagai taishi no kôgi de,“ \textit{Asahi Shim bun}, 24 October 1933: 1. As cited in \textit{OHTOMO} 1.} This incident made headlines in the Japanese press. According to Nami Ohtomo, the \textit{Asahi Shimbun} had two front-page articles in reaction to the incident. The first, published on October 20, was entitled „Conceited Nazis Begin to Insult Japanese – an Insubstantial Bill Concerning Racial Discrimination,“ and the second, published on October 24, had the title „German Foreign Minister Explains the Incident Involving Insult of Japanese in Response to Ambassador Nagai's Protest.\textsuperscript{56} According to The Times of London of October 24, Foreign Minister von Neurath apologized to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin for this attack on the girl.\textsuperscript{57} The follow-up to the incident even made its way into the Russian press, which stated that von Neurath had told Nagai that the German government had decided to recognize the Japanese race as the equivalent of the Nordic-Germanic races.\footnote{BAKobl:R64IV/31:45.}

Thus, already by the fall of 1933, the Nazi racial laws, speeches, and discrimination cases had provoked outrage in the Japanese government and the public. Germans, too, began to express misgivings about the application of the \textit{Rassengesetz} to the Japanese. For instance, the prominent historian of East Asi-\footnote{AA.8791; E612542–48, Sommer / AA, Leningrad 10 December 1933, as cited in FOX 86–87.}
an art Otto Kümmel implicitly argued against Nazi racism toward Japanese in a lecture he gave at the Society for Germanic Pre- and Early History: he emphasized the worthiness of the Japanese people by pointing out that their roots went back to Western Europe – hence the Aryan race – in prehistoric times. Also, in a lecture entitled „The People and Race of the Great Japanese Empire“ given at the DJG and probably also at a lecture-series open to the public at the Institute for Oriental Languages, Dr. Fritz Härtel stated:

Racial differences are not absolute … The worth of a race is to be judged less by physical features (i.e. color), than by its cultural and ethical achievements … Today in the East, Japan is the guardian, not only of the eastern, but also of the western culture-world …

Most notably, in October 1934, Nazi writer and journalist Dr. Johann von Leers produced a twelve-page „DJG Memorandum on the Question of the Application of the Racial Laws to the Offspring of the German-Japanese Mixed Marriages“ (Denkschrift der DJG zur Frage der Anwendung der Rassengetzung auf die Abkommelinge aus deutsch-japanischen Mischehen). Dated October 25, it was sent the next day by Admiral Paul Behncke, the President of the DJG, to Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick, Foreign Minister Freiherr von Neurath, Reichsminister and Führer's Secretary Rudolf Hess, and four days later to Walter Gross, the Head of the Racial Policy Office (Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP). The aim of the Memorandum was to persuade Nazi authorities to exempt the Japanese from Nazi racism toward all non-Aryans.

59 Otto Kümmel (1884–1952) served as Director of Department for East Asian Art of Berlin (Direktor der Berliner Ostasiatischen Kunstabteilung) and General Director of Museums of Berlin (Generaldirektor der Berliner Museen). It was Kümmel more than anyone else who promoted the study of East Asian art history in Germany. In Japanisches-Deutches-Zentrum Berlin, [Hrsg. von Hartmut Walraeven] Du verstehst unsere Herzen gut. [You Understand Our Hearts Well] (Weinheim: VCH, Acta Humaniora, 1989) 117 (zugleich Heft 139–142 der NOAG, Hamburg).

60 Otto Kümmel's lecture at the Gesellschaft für Germanische Ur- und Vorgeschichte, reported in Nachrichtendienst des Japanischen Vereins (Press Agency of the Japan Association) Nr. 293, 1 November 1933. Cited in HACK 5 [vgl. HAASCH 215].

61 „Rassenunterschiede sind nicht absolut … Der Wert einer Rasse ist weniger nach körperlichen Merkmalen (z.B. Farbe) als nach ihren kulturellen und ethischen Leistungen zu beurteilen … Heute ist Japan im Osten der Wächter nicht nur der östlichen, sondern auch der westlichen Kulturwelt …“

Abstract of the lecture, „Völker und Rassen des Großjapanischen Reiches,“ by Prof. Dr. med. Fritz F. Härte. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 89–90. Also cited in HACK footnote No. 229 [vgl. HAASCH 215]. Fritz Härte (1877–1937) was a surgeon who taught at the Osaka Prefectural Medical University (Osaka Furitsu Ika Daigaku) from 1922 to 1930. After his return to Germany, he became head of the medical department of the Oskar-Zietzen-Krankenhaus in Berlin. He was an active contributor to the DJG and also promoted the medical exchange between Japan and Germany.

Curiously, although the Memorandum was signed only by the President of the DJG, Admiral Paul Behncke, it should be emphasized that the author was Dr. von Leers, a Nazi writer and an expert on the „Jewish question.“ According to historian Ernst Presseisen, von Leers was the only one among top Nazi authorities who rejected „all propositions favoring a racial foreign policy“ and stood for „power politics pure and simple.“

Soldiers express his thoughts with an amazing frankness in 1934:

> We cannot expect that in politics all our friends will do us the favor to acquire blue eyes and blond hair for our sake. Politics is a matter of real, popular interests, and has little connection with the ideas of racial community. 64

Although von Leers wrote the DJG Memorandum, his name only appeared on the cover letter of the original copy and not on the copies sent to top Nazi officials. 65 Evidently, von Leers, who was a minority in the Nazi Party for favoring a „race-free“ foreign policy, thought that he would be better able to advance his arguments through the DJG than in direct confrontation with other Nazi officials. Hence, the DJG Memorandum signified an intra-Party conflict on the race question regarding the Japanese, while the DJG merely served as a medium in which this conflict took place.

The Memorandum first cited recent instances of racial discrimination against half-Japanese Germans. It argued that discrimination against this group of people would be detrimental to Germany, since many of their fathers played influential roles in German-Japanese relations. Furthermore, the Memorandum reexamined and emphasized the importance of maintaining good relations with Japan. After all, Japan was the only superpower which lacked those forces (i.e. Jewry, Freemasonry, Ultramontanism, Communism, Social Democracy) that were leading a propaganda war against the German Reich. „The only obstacle between us [Germany] and Japan is this unfortunate Race Question, which – if not solved or if solved only unsatisfactorily – threatens to destroy the good relationship.”

In the next section, the Memorandum tried to prove the racial worthiness of the Japanese. It argued that the classification of races into white, red, black, yellow and brown was outdated; therefore, the terms, „colored“ and „yellow race“ had to be completely eliminated from the racial laws. The Memorandum then listed a number of sources cited in Günther's book „The Northern Race

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63 Presseisen, Germany and Japan 9.
64 Johann von Leers, „Japanische Neuformung.“ Die Tat. 26 (September 1934) 411–423. As cited in Presseisen Germany and Japan 66.
65 Frieze 26.
66 „Das einzige Hemmnis zwischen uns und Japan ist diese unselige Rassenfrage, die, nicht gelöst oder ungünstig gelöst, zur Zerstörung der guten Beziehungen zu führen droht.“ In DJG Memorandum, as cited in Frieze 41.

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among the Indogermanic Asians" in an effort to prove the Aryan roots of the Japanese – an obvious attempt to appeal to the racist mind of Nazi officials. The sources in Günther's book came from Germans who had travelled or lived in Japan and had written about their experience there. For instance, von Siebold, von Baelz, and Prichard all recorded that they had seen blond Japanese. Globus wrote that 9.3% of the Japanese had medium-brown eyes, 0.7% light-brown eyes, and 0.5% blue eyes; moreover, 82% had dark-brown hair, 0.15% medium-brown hair and reddish hair. Günther's own observation that the Japanese statesmen and admirals looked "un-Japanese" in that their features were often European (i.e., "small face," "high nose-bridge") was also included. In addition, the Memorandum quoted von Rein, who wrote at the beginning of the twentieth century: "Not only in color, but also in their facial form do the Japanese frequently resemble the Southern European. The Japanese call the newborns 'Akambo,' or 'red child.' The red color stands out stronger and stays longer, like with Europeans ..." The existence of coats-of-arms, swastika and spiral-rising-sun as symbols in both Japan and Europe further attested to their common origins. Hence, the conclusion: there was an undeniable racial and cultural connection between the Japanese and the northern race. Only an outspoken Nazi writer – and not the DJG – would have known to devise such a comprehensive analysis of the racial worthiness of the Japanese and appeal to the racist mentality of Nazi authorities.

Based on the far-fetched premise that the Japanese traced their roots back to the Aryan race, the Memorandum advised the Nazi officials to replace the term "colored" by "Jews and those belonging to primitive races" – which would eliminate the possibility that the East-Asian races would be subject to Nazi racial laws.

The first to respond to the Memorandum was the Foreign Ministry, the authority most sensitive to the diplomatic consequences of Nazi racism. In fact,
already on October 15, the Foreign Ministry had called for an interministerial meeting for November 15 on the theme: „How to fight against the unfavorable consequences of the German racial policy on foreign relations.” 73 In a letter to the DJG dated November 6, Head of the Referat Deutschland department in the Foreign Ministry, Vicco von Bülow-Schwante, expressed his hope to make use of the Memorandum at this meeting. 74 The Foreign Ministry – as we shall confirm in a moment – was in full agreement with the DJG on the necessity of exempting the Japanese from the racial laws.

At the interministerial meeting of November 15, 1934, 75 which was attended by more than thirty-five officials from eight ministries and offices, von Bülow-Schwante proposed that the racial laws be restricted to Jews, which would be accomplished by replacing the term „non-Aryans“ by „Jews.“ This would eliminate the ambiguity inherent in the racial laws and would pacify Asian nations such as Japan and China, as well as South America. The Interior Ministry, represented by Ministerial Director Dr. Nicolai, welcomed von Bülow-Schwante's proposal and, moreover, „demanded many times that only a positive change in German racial laws“ (restricting them to Jews) would eliminate the present ambiguity. Such a change, he assured, would have no negative effect on the Nazi racial principle.

However, Dr. Gross of the Racial Policy Office and the Auslands-Organisation objected to the proposal from the outset. Gross explained that the Nazis were not in the position to change the fundamentals of the Rassenfrage which formed the core of the national socialist world view. The Auslands-Organisation expressed a fear that any change in the racial laws would be seen abroad as a retreat („Rückzug“) or a weakening of their racial position. The authorities failed to reach a conclusion regarding the proposal at the meeting. They agreed, however, that diplomatically inconvenient cases would be treated as exceptions to the racial laws. 76

73 „Ich lade zu einer Besprechung über die Frage, in welcher Weise nachteiligen Rückwirkungen der deutschen Rassenpolitik auf die Beziehung zu auswärtigen Staaten entgegengewirkt werden kann, am 15 November …“ An invitation letter dated 15 October 1934 from AA to other ministries. AA: R99182; E257078.

74 „In einer demnächst stattfindenden Besprechung der beteiligten Ressorts hoffe ich ihren Inhalt, von dem ich mit Interesse Kenntnis genommen haben, verwerten zu können.“ In letter von Bülow-Schwante / DJG, 6 November 1934. AA: R99182; E257090.

75 All subsequent quotes regarding this meeting (unless indicated otherwise) are from: „Protokoll über die Besprechung im Auswärtigen Amt vom 15. November 1934 über die Frage, wie den nachteiligen Wirkungen der deutsche Rassenpolitik auf die Beziehungen Deutschlands zu auswärtigen Staaten begegnet werden könne. “ („Minutes on the discussion at the Foreign Ministry of 15 November 1934 regarding the question: how could one prevent the negative effects of the German race policy on Germany's foreign relations.“) AA: R99182; E257118-E257125.

The Foreign Ministry continued to complain about the diplomatic inconvenience of the racial laws. Two years later, in November 1936, it mentioned that the Rassenfrage continued to be "something of a strain on our relations" with the East Asian nations. In February 1937, it proposed once again that the racial laws be restricted to Jews only. Because the number of non-Jewish mixed marriages was small, the Ministry explained, any change in the racial laws which exempted non-Jewish non-Aryans would not seriously harm "the domestic interest." Gross continued to oppose this proposal, claiming that the racial laws should remain unchanged. The Interior Ministry, which had enthusiastically supported the proposal in 1934, had completely reversed its position by April 1937: Staatssekretär (Assistant Secretary) of the Interior Minister Hans Pfundtner stated that such a change would be "impossible" because "the ultimate goal of the National Socialist movement is to eliminate all people of foreign blood from the German population." Thus, the proposal was never accepted. The failure of the Foreign Ministry to bring about any significant change in the racial laws to accommodate Germany's diplomatic interests testified to the staunchness of Nazi racial ideology.

It was only in January 1935 that Walter Gross wrote back to the DJG regarding the Memorandum. His five-page letter dated January 30, 1935 simply reflected his obstinate racism toward all non-Aryans. Gross clearly ruled out the Memorandum's (or von Leer's) argument based on the Aryan roots of the Japanese. Even if the Japanese were descended from the Pre-Aryan race, Gross stated, it was so long ago that they had in the meantime been polluted by Mongolian features. Gross continued: if we were to use the argument that the Asian races traced their roots back to Aryanism – which they probably did – tomorrow we would be saying that "Africa's Negro tribes" also descended from Aryans,

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AA: R99182; E257124. This standard rule for exemptions was decreed by the Interior Ministry on 18 April 1935.

John Fox also recounts the interministerial meeting of 15 November 1934, in his book Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis. He analyzes this meeting more optimistically than I have done. He writes that "the Foreign Office's point of view was successfully carried," which I disagree with since there were strong voices of reluctance regarding the proposal, no conclusion was reached, and nothing concrete was implemented. Fox himself admits that "some of the proposals discussed" were "not finally decided upon ..." (FOX 91).

77 "... so bleibt doch bei dem übersteigerten Selbstgefühl und dem Misstrauen der ostasiatischen Völker die Rassenfrage eine gewisse Belastung für unsere Beziehungen ..." Cited in Foreign Ministry's Aufzeichnung (intraministerial notes), 17 November 1936. AA: R99182; E257180.

78 In letter AA / Mdl, 28 February 1937. AA: R99182; E257228.

79 AA: R99182; E257230.

80 "Endziel der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung ist es sonach, alle Personen arifremden Blutes aus dem deutschen Volkskörper auszuscheiden. Eine Beschränkung der gesamten Rassengesetzgebung auf die Juden ist also gerade mit einem der wichtigsten Punkte des Parteiprogramms nicht vereinbar und daher unmöglich." In letter Pfundtner Mdl / AA, 22 April 1937. AA: R99182; E257242.

and so forth.\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, Gross claimed, „every race-mixing is undesirable in Germany, whereby the so-called worthiness of the marriage-partner’s race is not an issue.‖\textsuperscript{82} Gross warned that this did not translate into a defamation of other races. He advised other races also to value their pure blood and protect it from pollution. Only reluctantly did he allow for exceptions to the racial laws in cases where a prohibition on the mixed marriage might pose political inconveniences. Thus, the head of the Racial Policy Office made a clear statement confirming the non-Aryan status of the Japanese as well as the staunch Nazi policy of protecting the purity of the „Aryan blood.‖

The latter point – the protection of „Aryan blood“ – was soon codified in the Gesetz zum Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre (Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor). Passed on September 15, 1935, this law forbade the marriage of Jews to Germans and prohibited the former to show German flags and national colors. It also gave a detailed list of those who could and could not marry each other. For instance, citizens with less than two fully Jewish grandparents were exempt from most rules. This Law of September 15, along with the Reich Citizenship Law (Reichsbürgergesetz) and the Law for the Protection of the Genetic Health of the German People (Gesetz zum Schutz der Erbgesundheit des deutschen Volkes – Ehegesundheitsgesetz) formed what became commonly known as the “Nuremberg Laws”\textsuperscript{83}

Although the Law of September 15 singled out only Jews\textsuperscript{84}, all other Nazi racial laws generally referred to „non-Aryans“ rather than specifically „Jews,“ or stated „non-Aryans, especially Jews.“ In fact, Staatssekretär Pfundtner admitted in a letter to the Foreign Ministry in 1937: „This racial doctrine makes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{81} „Soll aber wirklich in die Japaner doch einm al nordisches Blut gekommen sein, so liegt das so weit zurück und ist von den eigentlichen mongolischen Eigenschaften derart zersetzt … Jedenfalls müsste mit demselben Recht allen asiatischen Völkern einiges Ariertum zugebilligt werden. Mit den gleichen Gründen würden wir morgen vielleicht sämtliche Negerstämme Afrikas als Arierstämme ansprechen müssen …“ Walter Gross’s answer to the Memorandum. 30 January 1935. As cited in FRIESE 50.
\item \textsuperscript{82} „Jede Rassenmischung ist in Deutschland unerwünscht, wobei die sog. Wertigkeit des fremdrassigen Partners an sich gar keine Rolle spielt.‖ Gross, as cited in FRIESE 51.
\item \textsuperscript{83} Reichsbürgergesetz singled out Jews with more than one fully Jewish grandparent as being ineligible for citizenship, and the third law forbade the marriage of those who were handicapped or congenitally diseased. Dr. Wilhelm Stuckart and Dr. Hans Gloeke. Kommentare zur deutschen Rassengesetzgebung. (Commentary on the German Race Laws.) Vol. 1. (Munich and Berlin: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936) 31–46. Cited in Ohtomo 40–41.
\item \textsuperscript{84} The interministerial meeting of November 15, 1934 seemed to have influenced the Nürnberg Laws in that these laws specified „Jewish“ instead of „non-Aryan“ – a diplomatically expedient move. A Foreign Ministry record of November 17, 1936 stated, „the Nürnberg Laws replaced the negative term ‘non-Aryan’ by the positive term ‘Jewish’“. („Die Nürnberger Gesetze haben den negativen Begriff „nichtarisch“ durch die positive Bestimmung „jüdisch“ ersetzt.“) Cited in „Aufzeichnung“ 17 November 1936. AA: R99182. E257183.
\end{itemize}

no fundamental distinction in the treatment of the Jews and of people of other foreign races.”

The Nazis’ desire to protect the “Aryan blood” from all non-Aryan races became clear in many instances. Most notably, a Foreign Ministry record of November 17, 1936 mentioned that the Reich’s domestic interest lay in “the hundred-percent implementation of the racial principle,” which would not be achieved unless the racial laws were applied to non-Jewish non-Aryans. The Counselling Bureaus for the Promotion of Heritage and Race did not specify Jews when it stated in May 1935, “the marriage with a non-Aryan is to be warned against.” Furthermore, in a letter addressed to regional governments, the Interior Minister wrote that any mixed marriage with foreign races was a mental and spiritual degeneration (“geistige und seelische Entartung”). Nevertheless, there was no explicit, universal legal restriction on the marriage of a German to a Japanese. As Walter Gross had mentioned in his letter to the DJG, such a marriage was officially highly “unerwünscht” – undesirable. Although this claim came up again and again in Nazi papers dealing with race issues, it never became a law. Why?

That Hitler wanted to officially outlaw marriages between Germans and all non-Jewish foreigners was clearly expressed by Dr. Hans Lammers, the Reichsminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery. In response to Dr. Lammers’s interministerial letter indicating the Führer’s wish, Interior Minister Frick wrote that such a law would be acceptable, despite possible criticisms from abroad that individual freedom was being restricted in the German Reich. In this letter to Lammers, Frick also disclosed that only 2 percent of all marriages of Germans which took place in 1937 were with non-Germans, and only two-thirds of that “2%” involved non-Aryan non-Germans. Considering the small number of such “undesirable” marriages, Hitler’s wish to introduce a law which would eliminate this negligible percentage attests to his determination to fully enforce his racial ideology.

In preparing the draft for a law on the prohibition of mixed marriages, Justice Minister Gürtner, Interior Minister Frick, and Lammers (as spokesman for Hitler) debated whether the restriction should apply to all Germans living in and

85 „Diese Rassenlehre macht keinen grundsätzlichen Unterschied in der Behandlung der Juden und der Angehörigen anderer artfremder Rassen.” In letter Pfundtner Mdl / AA, 22 April 1937. R99182; E257242; Pfundtner had been instrumental in formulating the „Nuremberg Laws“.

86 In „Aufzeichnung“ of 17 November 1936. AA: R99182; E257184.

87 *Grundsätze für die Errichtung und Tätigkeit der Beratungsstellen für Erb- und Rassenpflege.* Published by the Reich’s and Prussian Ministry of Interior on 21 May 1935. BA Pots: R 43 II/720a; 34.


89 In letter Dr. Lammers / Dr. Gürtner, Mdl, 27 December 1938. BA Kobl: R 22 Justizministerium Hauptgebiet 9 Nr.465; 5. Emphasis is original.

90 In letter Frick Rdl / Lammers Rk. 7 January 1939. BA Kobl: R 22 9/465; 13–20.
outside of Germany. In March 1939, just as they had decided that the law should apply to all German citizens in Germany and only Party officials and civil servants outside of Germany, \(^{91}\) the Führer’s Deputy Martin Bormann raised objections, arguing on behalf of the *NSDAP Auslands-Organisation* (Nazi International Organization)\(^{92}\) that the restriction should apply to all Germans abroad. As for the difficulty of finding German marriage partners, Bormann assured that the *Auslands-Organisation* would actively help.\(^{93}\)

With Bormann’s alteration, the draft for the law was reviewed on August 11, 1939, by representatives from the Reich Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, High Command of the *Wehrmacht*, Interior Ministry, Führer’s Deputy Office, *Auslands-Organisation*, and the SS. However, before the draft could become a law, Germany had instigated World War II by invading Poland. Consequently, Hitler had „no objection that the proposal of the general law\(^{94}\) be withdrawn for the time being … but should be concluded at the latest toward the end of the war.\(^{95}\)” According to a letter from the Interior Minister in March 1943, the reason for this postponement was the possible inconveniences such a law might create for Germany’s foreign relations.\(^{96}\) Regarding the marriage restrictions specifically on civil servants in foreign offices, for which the Foreign Ministry wanted a clear resolution in the near future, Hitler explained that this would be carried out unofficially – by a decree which would not be publicly promulgated.\(^{97}\)

Therefore, the prohibition of marriages between Germans and non-Jewish foreigners was never codified due to the possibility of diplomatic inconveniences. However, that a law prohibiting marriages with foreigners would have

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\(^{91}\) More specifically, those abroad who were to be subjected to this law were: „Beamte, Angehörige der Wehrmacht und des Reichsarbeitsdienstes, Unterführer der NSDAP und ihrer Gliederungen, Angehörige der Parteigerichte und des Sicherheitsdienstes des SS.” BA Kobl: R 22 9/465; 32.

\(^{92}\) Auslands-Organisation was the NSDAP office concerned with members abroad, under Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle.

\(^{93}\) In letter Stellvertreter des Führers Martin Bormann / Lammers, 23 March 1939. BA Kobl: R 22 9/465; 43.

\(^{94}\) There was another proposal to restrict marriages specifically of civil servants in foreign offices.


\(^{96}\) In letter re: *Staatsangehörigkeit von Ehefrauen und Kindern*, („Citizenship of married women and children,”) Rdl / Rk, 19 March 1943. BA Kobl: R 22 9/465; 129.

\(^{97}\) „Da der Herr Reichsminister des Auswärtigen jedoch Wert darauf legt, daß die … besondere Regelung für die Ehen der Beamten des auswärtigen Dienstes möglichst bald ergeht, hat der Führer sich bereit erklärt, diese Regelung durch einen nicht zur Veröffentlichung bestimmten Erlaß alsbald zu treffen.” In letter re: *Ehen der Beamten des auswärtigen Dienstes*, („Marriages of civil servants in foreign service,“) Rk/ Rdl, RdJ, & StvF. 20 February 1940. BA Kobl: R 22 9/465; 105.

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been enacted had it not been for the outbreak of the war attests to widespread agreement among top Nazi officials on the application of the racial ideology to all non-Aryans. A letter from the Interior Ministry in 1943 stated, „There is no longer any doubt that unregulated marriages between Germans and foreigners are undesirable when viewed from a folkish and racial standpoint.“98 Moreover, the actual discrimination continued in Germany into the 1940s, as we shall see in the next chapter.

Despite the absence of a law prohibiting marriages between Germans and foreigners, Nazi authorities devised a series of ways of discouraging them. For one, there were regulations which put strong pressure on German citizens against marrying foreigners. According to the Erste Verordnung zur Ausführung des Personenstandsgesetzes of May 19, 1938 (First Regulation on the Execution of Law on Personal [Marital] Status), foreign nationals had to prove that there was no impediment to their marriage according to the laws of their home country (§ 21). It further required that the German partner prove his or her Deutscherblütigkeit (Aryan descent), which meant that half- or quarter-Jewish German citizens could not marry foreigners in Germany (§ 19). Moreover, § 21 No. 5 of the same decree vaguely stated that proof of racial identity shall be demanded of the German partner for both himself/herself and the non-German partner – an excellent device for putting pressure on „Aryan“ Germans to avoid marriage with foreigners, at least on the administrative level.99 Many other decrees put pressure on Germans not to marry any non-Aryans — German or non-German. The Reichserbhofgesetz (Estate Law) of September 29, 1933 stated that those who had Jewish or colored ancestors could not become farmers.100 Moreover, § 6 of Ausführungsverordnung zum Blutschutzgesetz (Regulation on the Execution of Blood-Protection Law) of November 14, 1935 proclaimed that a marriage would not take place „if the partner's blood-content endangered that of the offspring“,101 – which was as good as refusing to recognize racially mixed marriages. § 7 of the same decree required everyone who was engaged to present the

98 In letter re: Staatsangehörigkeit von Ehefrauen und Kindern, Rdl / Rk, 19 March 1943. BA Kob: R 22 9/465; 129.
99 Reichsgesetzblatt I. p. 533ff. In Bodo RICHTER and Hans BÖLFER, Das Deutsche Eherecht. (Berlin: Carl Heymann, 1940) 169–170. „Aus- or Durchführungsverordnungen“ were decreed by the government or even a lower administrative body. Because one could change them more easily than the actual laws, there was a number of them. These regulations were legally binding for the administration.
certificate of marriage fitness (*Ehetauglichkeitszeugnis*) before he or she could marry — an excellent way to prevent any „undesirable“ marriages.

Another way to discourage mixed marriages was to issue verbal and written orders to Nazi officials, stating that such marriages were highly undesirable. Franz Rademacher, who was responsible for the „Jewish question“ in the Foreign Ministry, issued a report within the Ministry on December 4, 1941, in which he threatened that any German woman who married a foreigner could be put in a concentration camp to be re-educated, and that a mixed offspring might be denied the right to reproduce. Also, Dr. Wetzel of the Racial Policy Office proposed to the Auslands-Organisation in May 1940 that the Reich should not grant passports to foreigners abroad who were married to Germans. Given that there was no legal provision for such a restriction, Wetzel proposed that a „secret“ order be issued to the relevant authorities to merely deny passports in those cases; this would be more „expedient“ and „practical“ than to create a new decree.

Although it is uncertain whether such proposals were implemented, they attest to the persistent effort of the Nazis to prevent mixed marriages.

Finally, it was through the use of propaganda that the Nazis tried to inculcate in Germans the „duty“ of maintaining the purity of the „Aryan blood.“ For instance, *Der Berliner Beobachter* of November 30, 1933 featured an interview with Interior Minister Dr. Frick, who told the readers that every German must remember that he/she „was of German blood.“ Frick went on to say that racial thinking must be instilled in youths both emotionally and rationally, that all children must be taught to reject everything which was racially foreign.

The SS-newspaper, *Das Schwarze Korps*, carried an article in February 1942 entitled „Politics Is No Fig Leaf,“ which stated that the German people wished to strengthen their northern elements by avoiding blood-mixing with other races. However, the article pointed out, this did not mean that the Germans discrimi-

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102 Reichsgesetzblatt 1 p. 1334. In Massfeller 382.
104 „Man könnte daran denken, die Paßvorschriften dahin zu ergänzen, daß in derartigen Fällen die Bettreffenden keinen Anspruch auf Ausstellung von deutschen Pässen haben. Zweckmäßiger erscheint es jedoch, im Wege von geheimen Verwaltungsanweisungen hier einfach anzuordnen, daß in solchen Fällen Pässe nicht ausgestellt werden … Es scheint … wohl praktischer.“ In letter RA (Rassenpolitisches Amt) / AO (Auslands-Organisation), signed Dr. Wetzel, 31 May 1940. AA: R99176.
105 „Der Rassegedanke kann und muß in zweierlei Form in die Jugend hineingetragen werden: gefühlsmäßig und verstandesmäßig … Es muß schon beim Kind erreicht werden, daß es alles rassenmäßig Fremde ganz instinctmäßig ablehnt.“ „Reichsinnenminister Dr. Frick über das Rassenproblem,“ („Interior Minister Dr. Frick on the race problem."") Der Berliner Beobachter. 30 November 1933. AA: R85849 „Politische Beziehungen Deutschlands zu Japan,“ („German-Japanese political relations“) Bd. 5, January 1933 – March 1934.
nated against other races: indeed, there was no law in Germany which forbade Germans to marry foreigners. At the same time, the fact that there was no written law prohibiting such a marriage did not mean that it was permitted. It was a "völkische Pflicht" ("folkish duty") of each and every German "to protect his or her blood." Written at a time when there was a surge in the population of foreign workers in Germany, the article reveals Nazi leaders' serious attempt to prevent the German people from marrying non-Aryans.

Thus, the Nazi regime neither allowed nor encouraged marriages between Germans and Japanese. However, despite a number of regulations which highly discouraged Germans from marrying people of Japanese descent, the government's power to prevent such marriages in reality was far from absolute. Year after year, Nazi officials were confronted with requests from Aryan German citizens who wanted to marry Japanese or Japanese-German individuals. All such requests were examined case by case, following the rule that "exceptions" would be granted only when the case affected diplomatic relations – i.e. when politically influential foreign or German personages were involved. In reality, however, the decisions on marriage cases were often arbitrary, as we shall see in the next chapter.

* * *

In sum, the Nazi racial laws were ambiguous, but allowed for racial discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent – both institutional discrimination based on their legal status as "non-Aryans," and discrimination in the realm of marriages. The attempts of the Foreign Ministry to restrict the racial laws to Jews met with fierce resistance from other ministries each time, despite the increasing diplomatic inconvenience. The official replacement of the terms "Aryan" and "non-Aryan," by "German persons and those of related blood" and

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106 "Daß das keine Diskriminierung fremdvölkischer Kavaliere und Herzensbrecher darstellt, ergibt sich, außer aus all dem, was schon gesagt wurde, auch daraus, daß es kein deutsches Gesetz gibt, daß das Heiraten Deutscher mit Fremdvölkischen grundsätzlich verbote. Wir behalten uns lediglich eine Begutachtung des Partners vor und stellen uns dabei die Frage, ob diese Verbindung der rassischen Struktur unseres Volkes förderlich oder schädlich sein könnte.

Und in dem Sinne, … ist es Pflicht sich der Verantwortung vor dem Volke auch dann bewußt zu sein … Für sie gilt nicht der Satz, daß erlaubt sei, was nicht verboten ist. Manch eine Handlung, die nicht verboten ist, kann dennoch ehrlös sein. "Die Politik ist kein Feigenblatt," Das Schwarze Korps. 12 February 1942. BAKobl: R 22 9/465; 127.

107 "… generell Ausnahmen zugelassen [von der damals bestehenden Rassengesetzgebung] sein sollten, soweit die ausserpolitische Interesse des Reichs durch rassenpolitische Massnahmen geschädigt würde. Diese Ausnahme erstreckt sich nicht auf Juden (Erlass des Reichs-und Preußischen Ministers des Innern vom 18.4.1935-1 A 1092/5012 b)." Cited in Foreign Ministry's "Aufzeichnung," 17 November 1936. AA: R99182; E257182. This Standard rule for exemptions was agreed upon at the interministerial meeting on November 15, 1934. It was decreed on April 18, 1935.

“Jews as well as other racially foreigners”\textsuperscript{108} in April 1936 did not affect the non-Aryan racial status of the Japanese. The Foreign Ministry admitted in 1937 that the new term was as ambiguous as the former term „non-Aryan,“ yet added that any clearer term would offend the nations concerned.\textsuperscript{109} Moreover, although a law explicitly forbidding racially mixed marriages did not exist, a series of decrees and regulations amounted to an indirect prevention of such marriages. The only legal statement which could spare people of Japanese descent and their spouses from any kind of racial discrimination was the decree of April 18, 1935: those non-Aryan individuals whose racial discrimination jeopardized Germany's diplomatic interests would be exempt from the racial laws. Thus, at least in law, diplomatic consideration was secondary to the racial ideology which served as the pillar of the Nazi regime.

3. Case Studies

Many contemporaries in the 1930s doubted the existence of racial discrimination against the Japanese. After all, Japan was Germany's ally. Futhermore, the Nazi regime openly claimed that they did not intend to racially discriminate against the Japanese. We have seen, for instance, that Foreign Minister von Neurath officially apologized in October 1933 for an attack by German youths on Takenouchi's daughter in Berlin, and assured that the Japanese were not considered „colored.“\textsuperscript{110} Such claim as this one gave rise to the rumor of the „honorary Aryan“ status: the Japanese were not racially „Aryan“ but would be treated as such because they were Germany's ally. \textit{The Times of London} and \textit{The New York Times} helped to spread this rumor internationally by publishing von Neurath's apology as well as other similar claims by the Nazis.\textsuperscript{111} The rumor was so widespread that even several Japanese-German victims of discrimination in Germany believed in it, as we shall see in this chapter. However, the fact remains that this special status for the Japanese was fictitious: a legal statement

\textsuperscript{108} „Personen deutschen und artverwandten Blutes einerseits, und Juden sowie sonstigen Artfremden andererseits ...“ In letter AA / all other ministries, 30 April 1936. AA: R99182; E257168.

\textsuperscript{109} „Der wissenschaftliche Begriff „artfremd“ ist keineswegs immer klar. Wenn er aber klar ist, so muss in den meisten Fällen aus Rücksicht auf die Empfindlichkeit bestimmter Völker auf seine Anwendung generell oder im Einzelfalle verzichtet werden.“ In letter AA / MdI, 28 February 1937. AA: R99182; E257229.

\textsuperscript{110} Von Neurath's Statement as printed in \textit{The Times of London} on October 24, 1933, as cited in \textit{FOX} 86. This news was also printed in \textit{The New York Times} on October 23, 1933.

\textsuperscript{111} For instance, \textit{The New York Times} printed in 1934: „Finally Nazi Germany has broken in favor of Japan, her proudest principle: namely, that of racial exclusiveness. The Japanese Government, as well as the Chinese, has been notified officially that German laws against „non-Aryans“ applied only to Jews and Negroes, not to the yellow race.“ „Japan Seen to Seek Support of Reich,“ a wireless to \textit{The NYT} from Berlin. \textit{The New York Times} 21 May 1934:6.
clearly indicating the „honorary Aryan“ status of the Japanese has never been found.112

This chapter will bring to light individual instances of racial discrimination which were recorded by the Deutsch-Japanische Gesellschaft (DJG), the Party Chancellery, the Foreign Ministry (Inland I Partei), and several other institutions and individuals. The victims were Japanese citizens, German citizens of Japanese descent (Japanese-Germans), and Germans who were married to Japanese or Japanese-Germans. We will examine various cases of racial discrimination, with a „case“ defined as a situation in which a victim of discrimination filed a complaint and brought it to the attention of Nazi authorities.

An average of five hundred Japanese citizens resided in Germany in the 1930s.113 The majority of these Japanese citizens were government officials, army and navy personnel, businessmen and students.114 Apparently, very few of them reported discrimination. Those who did were not affiliated with the Japanese government or major Japanese companies. The reason for this generally hospitable treatment of Japanese citizens under the racist Nazi regime was Realpolitik: the Reich would not antagonize Japanese „guests“ who resided temporarily in Germany for diplomatic or business purposes.

The overwhelming majority of discrimination cases involved German citizens: those who had a Japanese parent or grandparent, and their spouses. Ac-


113 According to the records of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the population of Japanese citizens in Germany in the 1930s was as follows: 1930: 635, 1931: 537, 1933: 1111, 1934: 530, 1935: 514, 1937: 471, 1938: 437. (There were no records for the years 1932, 1936, and 1939.) As cited by Mr. Wakabayashi, Head of the Records Reading Room (Kiroku etsuran shitsu chô) at the Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Japan, Tôkyô. In a telephone communiqué, February 1995.

114 For example, of the total of 514 in 1935, 124 were dependents (usually housewives and children), while the other 390 (only 12 of whom were women) were categorized by occupation as follows: 104 [27%] government officials, 92 [24%] students or interns, 66 [17%], navy and army personnel, 53 [14%] businessmen and bank personnel, 4 [1%] journalists, 29 [7%] miscellaneous others, 42 [11%] failed to report their occupations. Cited in „Population of Japanese citizens domiciled abroad, categorized by occupations. 1 October 1935.“ („Kai-gai kakuchi zairyû honpô naichijin shokugyôbetsu jinkô hyô, Shôwa 10 nen 10 gatsu 1 tachi.“) Inquiry Commission of the Foreign Ministry (Gaimushô chôsabu), Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Japan.

In the 1940s, the number of the navy and army personnel increased considerably, apparently because of the military alliance. For example, in Berlin in 1942, of the total of about 240 working Japanese citizens, 30% were government officials, 30% army and navy personnel, 25% businessmen, 10% academia-related people, and 5% journalists. Based on Shôwa 17 nen doitsu koku nihonjin meibo (1942 Directory of Japanese Residents in Germany) April 1942. ADJG file also contains similar figures for 1942. BAKobl: R 64 IV/163; 1–31.
According to the DJG Memorandum of October 1934, there were approximately fifty German-Japanese people in Germany. This number was probably the minimum possible since one of the aims of the Memorandum was to assure Nazi authorities that the exemption of the Japanese from the racial laws would only be a negligible infringement on Nazi racial ideology. In any case, given the relatively small population of Japanese-German people in Germany, the fact that at least sixteen\textsuperscript{115} of them reported discrimination to the DJG or Nazi authorities attests to the significant degree to which the racial laws were applied to individuals of Japanese descent. Furthermore, it is highly likely that more than sixteen Japanese-Germans experienced discrimination. Many more probably filed complaints to local Nazi offices that failed to reach higher authorities in Berlin. Others who encountered discrimination probably did not file official complaints. They probably emigrated to Japan or some other country, or were reemployed in the private sector, to which the racial laws failed to extend as far as employment was concerned.\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, racial discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent was probably even more serious and widespread than the evidence in this chapter suggests.

Racial discrimination of people of Japanese descent and their spouses can be categorized into three types: humiliation in public, expulsion from Nazi-related or public offices and professions, and marriage prohibition. The first type involved discrimination by a segment of the German civilian population, while the latter two types involved institutional discrimination by Nazi authorities. How did Nazi authorities handle these discrimination cases? Moreover, how did the victims react to their experiences of discrimination, and what methods did they employ to resolve their cases?

* * *

Perhaps the earliest reported instance of discrimination in public was that of Dr. Takenouchi's daughter — discussed in the previous chapter — who was verbally insulted and then hit by other elementary school children on her way to school in October 1933. The reason for this violence was that she was „colored.“ The aggressors were children who obviously had no foresight as to the diplomatic implications of their action. One of the goals of children's education under the Nazi regime was to indoctrinate racial thinking in youths „both emotionally and rationally“ and to make them „reject everything which was racially foreign.“\textsuperscript{117} The incident of Takenouchi's daughter reflects how thoroughly racism permeated some children in Berlin, although this phenomenon cannot be solely at-

\textsuperscript{115} This number refers to all Japanese-German individuals whose discrimination cases will be studied in this chapter, as well as other victims mentioned by them. It does not include Japanese-German individuals' spouses who also faced discrimination.


\textsuperscript{117} „Reichsinnenminister Dr. Frick über das Rassenproblem,“ („Interior Minister Dr. Frick on the race problem,“) Der Berliner Beobachter. 30 November 1933. AA: R85849.
tributed to the Nazis since such racism and xenophobia had already existed in Wilhelmine Germany.

Another evidence for racial discrimination against Japanese in public was reported by an unidentified Japanese businessman in Berlin in October 1935. He came to the German Foreign Ministry to complain that „in the last few months, German women and girls had been cautioned that anyone who accompanied Japanese people on the street and in restaurants would confront difficulties.“ It seemed that it was publicly regarded as „dishonorable to have friendly relations with Japanese.“ The businessman also referred to a court judgment passed in Breslau that a friendly interaction beyond what was required by business proprieties with a non-Aryan was a Rassenschande (racial defilement). This businessman’s complaint amounted to portraying a public that was indoctrinated with racism toward non-Aryans.

Surely, not all Germans blindly subscribed to Nazi racist propaganda, and the general reception to Nazi racism probably varied significantly according to the geographical location, social stratum, and educational level of an individual. Not surprisingly, however, some Germans were confused about the Rassenfrage in regard to non-Jewish non-Aryans. For instance, what exactly was a Rassenschande? A DJG file referred to two German individuals who had read an article in the Berliner Illustrierten Nachtausgabe, which stated that every friendly interaction with people of foreign races amounted to a Rassenschande. They wished to know whether they were allowed to be friendly to their Japanese acquaintances. Since committing a Rassenschande was a social crime, adopting Nazi racial codes became essential to many Germans. Learning to discriminate against others would spare one from becoming the target of discrimination oneself. Such circumstances explain the successful indoctrination of racism in some segments of the German population.

118 „Der Japanische Geschäftsträger hat … darauf hingewiesen, daß in den letzten Monaten wiederholt deutsche Frauen und Mädchen, die hier lebende Japaner auf der Straße oder in Restaurants begleitet hätten, dadurch in Schwierigkeiten geraten seien. In der deutschen Bevölkerung herrsche anscheinend vielfach der Glaube, daß es unehrenhaft sei, freundschaftliche Beziehungen zu Japanern zu unterhalten …“.


On the other hand, according to three former businessmen (all Japanese citizens) who worked for the Mitsubishi Company in Berlin in the late 1930s and early 1940s, racism toward Japanese in any form was non-existent.\(^\text{120}\) To be sure, Mitsubishi was one of the most prominent Japanese companies in Germany. Given the company's prominence in Japan, the Reich would certainly not discriminate against these businessmen. Mr. Hattori, who worked in the Mitsubishi Berlin office from 1936 to 1945, stated that wherever he went, he would show Ambassador Ōshima's name card and he was treated superbly well – apparently for diplomatic reasons. These businessmen did not know of any Japanese citizen living in Germany who had complained about racial discrimination. In fact, Mr. Hattori and Mr. Kambayashi could not believe, when informed, that there had been cases of discrimination against Japanese-German individuals. This ignorance owed itself partly to their minimal social contact with Germans and Japanese outside of their own circles of elite businessmen and diplomats. Another reason for their perhaps justified ignorance lay in the likelihood that discrimination against the Japanese in public occurred less frequently in the late 1930s when the Nazis launched pro-Japanese propaganda in Germany to muster popular support for the German-Japanese alliance.\(^\text{121}\)

That racism toward all non-Aryans had permeated some German communities is evidenced by the experience of Hilde O.\(^\text{122}\), a half-Japanese German citizen. She reported to the DJG in January 1936 that she and her Japanese mother had been verbally insulted on the open streets in the rural town of Naumburg, in particular by one retired civil servant and his wife, who yelled after them: „Asian, German-Japanese mish-mash, African-Chinese ... Japanese out“, etc.\(^\text{123}\) Ms. O. wrote that even their friends had come to alienate them since

\(^{120}\) In interviews with former Mitsubishi businessmen, Mr. Kambayashi and Mr. Hattori in Tōkyō, September 1995. Also, MIYAKE Matao, *Ikigai no ki*. (Tōkyō: Idemitsu kōsan, 1992). Mr. Kambayashi was in Berlin 1941–1945, Mr. Hattori 1936–1945, and Mr. Miyake 1939–1945.

\(^{121}\) The alliance began with the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936, which Italy joined in November 1937. Germany and Japan concluded the Cultural Pact in November 1938, and the Axis Agreement in September 1940.

\(^{122}\) The name has been abbreviated so as not to invade the privacy of the person involved. This pertains to all further mention of the person, including direct quotations from documents and other sources. Such abbreviations will be used for the name of all other persons in this article, who are not sufficiently renowned to be regarded as historical figures in their own right.


anybody who interacted with them would be committing a *Rassenschande*. In such a rural town as Naumburg, she wrote, psychological association between her and a *Rassenschande* spread so fast that consequently, she was not able to get a job, nor would she be able to marry. Therefore, she requested an official passport-like certificate proving that she was German.

The Foreign Ministry informed O. via DJG that she was definitely not Aryan\(^\text{124}\), and therefore she should apply to be treated as an exception to the racial laws. This official statement that she was non-Aryan clearly refuted the often cited rumor that Japanese were „honorary Aryans.” Regarding verbal insults in public, the Ministry advised her to file a libel complaint. As for her employment, Ms. O. would have to have a proof that she was denied a job because of her Japanese descent – i.e. a rejection letter from a company. Evidently, the Foreign Ministry's response to O.’s case did nothing to improve her situation. What exactly happened with her afterwards is not recorded by the DJG.

Another example involved Hatsuko E., a half-Japanese German citizen. While dancing with her childhood friend Sch. – an air force student – in a dance hall, a lieutenant ordered Sch. to leave the place at once because it was not appropriate for a man in his uniform to be dancing with a Japanese.\(^\text{125}\) She referred to this incident as indescribably embarrassing and requested an official explanation. Interestingly, F.’s German stepmother wrote to the DJG in defense of F., stating that she and the airforce student were no more than just friends. Her emphasis on their „pure friendship”\(^\text{126}\) indicated that the stepmother had speculated the reason for F.’s discrimination to be the lieutenant’s fear of the possibility of marriage between Sch., a German officer, and F., a non-Aryan – a highly discouraged, if not explicitly prohibited, union. However, the War Ministry and Aviation Ministry reported to the DJG in August 1937 that the lieutenant

\[\text{Neuerdings wird von der betreffenden Familie verbreitet, ich könne ja keiner heiraten,}
\text{denn das wäre ja dann Rassenschande …}
\text{… Durch diese Beschimpfungen und Verächtlichmachungen, die sich gerade in einer solchen Stadt wie der hiesigen sehr schnell herumsprechen, wird mir das Beschaffen einer Stellung unmöglich gemacht …}”

\[\text{In letter O. / DJG, 5 January 1936. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 112–114. Subsequent citations are taken from this passage.}\]

\[\text{124} \text{„Sie [sind] infolge der japanischen Rassenzugehörigkeit Ihrer Mutter nach der neuesten}
\text{Gesetzgebung nicht als arisch anzusehen und daher kommt eine generelle Bescheinigung}
\text{Ihrer Deutschblütigkeit nicht in Frage.” In letter DJG / O., 24 January 1936. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 107.}\]

\[\text{125} \text{„Herr Sch. [F.’s friend and dancing partner] bekam Befehl [von Oberleutnant Hevilcke der}
\text{Kriegsschule in Dresden] das Lokal sofort zu verlassen, da es sich nicht mit seiner Uniform}
\text{vereinbaren lasse, mit einer Japanerin zu tanzen, und er sich nicht in passender Gesellschaft}
\text{befände.” In letter F. / DJG, date not cited, but probably in June 1937. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 306.}\]

\[\text{126} \text{„Ich weiss, es ist nicht nur eine Vermutung, dass es sich bei allen diesen noch sehr jungen}
\text{Leuten um eine reine Kameradschaft handelt, jede andere Vermutung oder Auslegung wäre}
\text{geradezu eine unerhörte Verleumdung.” In letter G (Hatsukoko's stepmother) / DJG President}
\text{Admiral Forster, 2 July 1937. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 303. Emphasis is original.}\]
expelled the student from the dance hall by simply stating „your conduct does not befit your uniform,“ and said nothing about F.’s Japanese appearance. The lieutenant explained later that F.’s conduct by dancing was not proper. Although the true reason for Sch.’s expulsion from the dance hall cannot be known, it is unlikely that the reason was F.’s conduct since she was outraged enough to request an official explanation.

Both O.’s and F.’s cases showed that even Germans who had interacted only socially with people of Japanese descent could be punished in subtle ways -such as castigation by members of the community or an official rebuke. Nazi authorities, especially Walter Gross of the Racial Policy Office and Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick, repeatedly exalted the „Aryan race“ and condemned _Rassen-schande_ in various Nazi publications. Their success, though surely limited, was evidenced by instances of racial discrimination against Japanese and Japanese-German individuals in public – a sign of thorough indoctrination of racism among some Germans.

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The next category of discrimination involved institutional discrimination based on Japanese-Germans’ legal status as non-Aryans. Most often, this involved expulsion of people of Japanese descent and their spouses from public institutions and the Nazi party. The discrimination was carried out by civil servants and local Nazi authorities, and confirmed that the racial laws applied to individuals of Japanese descent.128

The earliest and perhaps the most prominent of such discrimination was that of Dr. Urhan. We may recall from the previous chapter that Dr. Urhan became unemployed in May 1933 because he was half Japanese. The sensational press coverage in Japan of the racial justification for Dr. Urhan's dismissal was a source of great embarrassment to the Reich and forced Nazi authorities to issue official apologies.

Thus, Dr. Urhan's case clearly manifested to Nazi authorities the diplomatic inconvenience of racial discrimination against people of Japanese descent in Germany. In fact, as we already know, diplomatic expediency led to a decree of April 18, 1935: non-Aryan individuals, whose racial discrimination by the Reich would jeopardize Germany's foreign relations, would be exempt from the racial laws.129 This general rule for exemption was clear and simple in words,


128 Some examples of these racial laws are mentioned in the beginning of Chapter 2.

129 Cited in „Aufzeichnung.“ 17 November 1936. AA: R99182; E257182.
but highly problematic and complicated in practice. How could Nazi authorities determine the diplomatic implication of every discrimination case? Were only individuals of politically powerful families exempt? Or was anyone with personal ties to Japan exempt?

In general, the way Nazi authorities dealt with all types of discrimination against Japanese, Japanese-Germans, and their spouses was inefficient and arbitrary. They did not give a final decision for a long time. No decisions were issued for some cases. Moreover, in many instances, no justifications accompanied the authorities' final decisions.

The major reason for the inefficiency and arbitrariness in the authorities' handling of discrimination cases lay in the absence of clear, official racial policy in regard to the Japanese. The Foreign Ministry, which served as the intermediary between the Japanese government and the Nazi regime, was the authority most sensitive to the diplomatic implications of Nazi racism. The Ministry was also an intermediary between the Japanese-German community in Germany and the Nazi regime. Therefore, the Ministry usually preferred to exempt Japanese individuals from the racial laws when there was any hint of diplomatic inconvenience. We may recall that the Foreign Ministry proposed to restrict the racial laws to only Jews at the interministerial meeting on November 15, 1934. This possibility continued to be on the Ministry's agenda in 1937. On the other hand, the Racial Policy Office of Dr. Gross was keen on the hundred-percent implementation of Nazi racism against all non-Aryans. Gross remained reluctant to allow diplomatic expediency take precedence over racial ideology, and thus continued to resist the Foreign Ministry's proposal to restrict the racial laws to Jews. The Interior Ministry supported the Foreign Ministry's position at the interministerial meeting of November 1934, but quickly shifted over to Gross's side afterwards. Other ministries seemed confused but generally leaned toward Gross. Consequently, the absence of clear, official policy, the persistence of interministerial disagreements, and the general confusion of Nazi authorities on the treatment of Japanese-Germans contributed to the long or indefinite waiting time for many victims and to arbitrary decisions.

Among many discrimination cases, that of the Aoki-Hatzfeldt and the Hatzfeldt-Neipperg families clearly attests to the general uncertainty regarding

130 The Foreign Ministry was the first ministry to which the DJG brought racial discrimination cases.

131 The family tree of the Aoki family:
Viscount Aoki—von Rhaden
V
Hanna Aoki—Alex von Hatzfeldt
V
Hissa Hatzfeldt—Erwin von Neipperg
V
a small son
the discrimination cases of Japanese-Germans. Late Viscount Aoki, who had been Japanese Consulate General in Berlin and then Foreign Minister, married Ms. von Rhaden, an „Aryan“ German. Their half-Japanese daughter Hanna and their quarter-Japanese granddaughter Hissa were denied admission to charity groups prior to April 1934. Hanna’s husband, Count Alex von Hatzfeldt, asked Dr. Solf (former ambassador to Japan) for help, expressing his fear that discrimination would probably not stop with this incident. He was correct: two years later in March 1936, a letter from the German Ambassador to Japan, von Dirksen, to the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin disclosed that Count Alex von Hatzfeldt had been denied admission to the nobility because he was married to a non-Aryan. For the same reason, his son-in-law Count Erwin von Neipperg was expelled from the SA and from the nobility after twelve years of membership, and his medical practice was terminated. Neither the DJG files nor the Foreign Ministry records comment on whether the case was eventually resolved in the victims’ favor. However, Ambassador von Dirksen's letter strongly recommended an „exceptional treatment“ (Ausnahmebehandlung) of the case, referring to the political significance of late Viscount Aoki and his descendants' connections to the Japanese nobility. Therefore, it would not be far-fetched to assume that they were eventually treated as an „exception“ to the racial laws. The Aoki family’s case reveals, nevertheless, that even where political significance was quite clear, a case could remain unresolved for years.

That the discrimination experience of the Aoki family continued for at least two years (it began in 1934, and had not been resolved as of 1936) can be partly explained by the uncertainty as to which authority was responsible for the Rassenfrage in regard to the Japanese. In trying to help the Aoki-Hatzfeldt family, Dr. Solf wrote that the difficulty lay in finding the right person who was responsible for these matters. In fact, the Office of the Führer sent a letter in August 1934 to all ministries, which stated, „several recent incidents have manifested that there is still no consensus, which is necessary, among all authorities on the handling of the race question.“ To solve this problem, the Racial Policy Office (Rassenpolitisches Amt) was created and officially designated as the responsible authority on the race question in August 1934. However, as the re-


The DJG files confuse Hanna Hatzfeldt-Aoki with her mother Ms. von Rhaden, therefore falsely implying that Hanna was fully German and Hissa a half-German.

132 „… solche Sachen dauern lange … wegen der Schwierigkeit betreffs Sicherheit, die Persönlichkeit zu finden, die letzten Endes für die Entscheidung zuständig ist.“

In letter Solf / Hatzfeldt, 9 May 1934. BA Kobl: NLSolf/93; 113–114.

133 „Mehrere Vorfälle der letzten Tage bewiesen, daß in der Behandlung rassenpolitischer Fragen noch immer nicht die notwendige Übereinstimmung in der Haltung aller Behörden erzielt ist und daß insbesondere häufig nicht auf die außenpolitischen Auswirkungen Rücksicht genommen wird, die auf diesem Gebiete jede Maßnahme und Verlautbarung hat.“


discords of discrimination cases show, in reality, the Interior, Justice, Propaganda, Labor, and Foreign Ministries all took part in the decision-making processes. Consequently, the Japanese-German discrimination cases were transferred from one authority to another and back, without anybody making a final decision for many months, even years.

The general disorganization on the part of the authorities is clearly reflected in the handling of Dr. Ludwig D.’s discrimination case. The Nazi authorities prohibited D. from continuing with his medical practice on July 21, 1934, because he was married to a half-Japanese, Agnes G. He was then denied admission to work in the state-administered health insurance in the town of Weißenfels (Reichsgesetzliche Krankenkasse für Weißenfels). In his desperate effort to get official permission to work as a Kassenarzt (health insurance doctor), Dr. D. wrote a letter to the Foreign Ministry, in which he emphasized the prominence of his half-Japanese wife’s father, Professor Konrad G., who “promoted German interests in China for the past thirty years.” The subsequent letters, as well as his trip to the Foreign Ministry, solved nothing. D. then went to the Interior Ministry where Dr. Achim Gercke replied that he no longer had authority on this issue. The Japanese Embassy sent Dr. D. to the Japan Institute, which then sent him back to the Foreign Ministry where he talked to Legationsrat von Erdmannsdorf in the „Asian Departement” of the Ministry. The latter promised to do his best to help D. In the meantime, D. was told that the Labor Ministry was responsible for his case – which turned out to be a „mistake” as he found after his visit. The Japan Institute then advised him to go to the above mentioned Dr. Johann von Leers, a prolific writer on the race issue and the author of the DJG Memorandum, who was „very obliging and promised to want to help”. Von Leers also advised D. to talk to Dr. Scholz of the NSDAP Liaison Office (Verbindungsstab der NSDAP). It turned out that Dr. Scholz had been transferred to the Foreign Ministry, and was fully informed of D.’s case, having discussed it with von Erdmannsdorf. D. then left Berlin for his home in Weißenfels, „feeling that he could count on sure success.”

His optimism was betrayed, since nothing happened for the next two months. He complained that he was still unable to get an official statement that the Japanese were not non-Aryan, although he had read about it in various sources. He then wrote to Dr. Solf asking him to exert his influence on the authorities. Dr. Solf wrote back that there had been at least three cases like that of Dr. D. in the

134 In letter D. / AA, 1 August 1934. BA Kohl: NL Solf/93; 134.
135 We may recall from Chapter 2 that Dr. Gercke was a specialist on race research at the Interior Ministry who told several Japanese journalists in October 1933, that the Japanese were indeed a „colored race” – which provoked an outrage in the Japanese public. According to John Fox, Gercke was approached by Meyer of the Foreign Ministry regarding these „careless statements.” Dr. Gercke promised that the race problem would be from then on passed immediately to the relevant officials in the Interior and Justice Ministries. In FOX 87.
136 „Ich ... verließ Berlin mit dem Gefühl, auf sicheren Erfolg rechnen zu können.” Cited in letter Konrad G. / Solf, 14 November 1934. BA Kohl: NL Solf/93; 141.

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recent past; and in all of them he was unable to exercise any kind of influence. In another letter to the Foreign Ministry in October 1934, D. importuned them to speed up the process of his case's examination, since every passed day „drives me and my family nearer to a catastrophe!“ Finally in December 1934, D. received a note from the Foreign Ministry which gave him „a justified hope for a happy solution to the difficulties.“ Nevertheless, his case would not be resolved until four months later in April 1935. The reason for this delay seems to have been the lack of consensus or a simple lack of communication between the ministries. While the Propaganda Ministry told D. that it had agreed with the Interior Ministry that „Japanese would not be considered non-Aryan according to the regulations on licensing/admission,“ the Interior Ministry told D. that his case was still pending. Frustrated at the contradiction, D. exclaimed, „it is incomprehensible to me … that on one side, such a clear message was made (Propaganda Ministry), and on the other side, people tell me everything is still pending.‖ Most surprisingly, the final decision that resolved D.'s case in his favor in April 1935 came from the Labor Ministry. This case thus attests to the lack of informed cooperation among Nazi authorities, and to the absence of a coherent racial policy regarding the Japanese-German individuals. In replying to Ernst T., a German citizen who was eventually forbidden to join the Party because he was married to a Japanese-German, the DJG wrote in March 1935: „... the question of German-Japanese mixed offspring and their potential recognition as Aryan is still pending in the Interior Ministry.‖ Was there ever a clear policy in practice regarding discrimination cases of Japanese-German individuals? One is tempted to answer in the negative.

One can also interpret D.'s numerous visits to various authorities and the delay for the final decision as the Nazi authorities' way of evading Japanese-

137 „Der von Ihnen vorgetragene Fall ist der vierte dieser Art, in dem ich raten und helfen soll. Es ist aber nicht zu helfen, meine Bemühungen bei der zuständigen Stelle würden nach meinen Erfahrungen ergebnislos sein.“ Cited in letter Solf / D., 30 October 1934. BA Kobl: NL Solf/93; 136.


140 „Mir ist es offengestanden nicht verständlich, wie es möglich ist, dass mir auf der einen Seite so eindeutige Mitteilungen gemacht werden (S. Propagandaministerium), während andererseits gesagt wird, dass noch alles in der Schwebe sei.“ In letter D. / von Leers, 24 February 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 141.

141 Disclosed in a Foreign Ministry record of 4 May 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 137.

142 „... die Frage der deutsch-japanischen Blutmischung und ihre eventuelle Anerkennung als arisch [ist] beim Reichsinnenministerium noch immer in der Schwebe.“ In letter DJG / T., 4 March 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 131.

German discrimination cases. In fact, in a conversation regarding marriage cases of Japanese-Germans, Chief of Reich Chancellery, Dr. Lammers, once told Hitler that postponement in giving final decisions can be a way of preventing such marriages without having to issue an official approval – a scheme to which Hitler agreed. Therefore, the Nazi authorities’ long delay in issuing decisions for Japanese-German discrimination cases, especially in the late 1930s and early 1940s, was possibly a strategy to avoid giving any final verdict which might upset Japan and jeopardize German-Japanese relations.

A relatively significant number of reported instances of institutional discrimination involved medical students or doctors – as in Dr. D.’s case. There were probably more discrimination cases than were recorded by the DJG, the Party Chancellery, and the Foreign Ministry. Therefore one cannot assume that people in the field of medicine confronted more obstacles than others – although this remains a possibility. It is worth examining the cases of medical professionals because of their frequent appearances in the examined files, and moreover, because the types of discrimination they faced were legally applicable to those outside of the medical field.

Unlike Dr. D. who was already in medical practice, Mario F., Heinz Sch., and Wilhelm B. were medical students. F., a half-Japanese student in a medical school in Munich since November 1934, was not allowed to take final examinations. The Interior Ministry wrote to the other ministries in February 1936 that F.’s case would be treated as an „exception” to the racial laws if they did not object to it within a week. It is unclear why the Interior Ministry decided to exempt F. Since there is no mention of any objection to the Interior Ministry’s proposal from the other ministries, one might assume that the Bavarian government was eventually ordered to allow F. to take the examinations.

B.’s and Sch.’s cases were more complicated and time-consuming. The half-Japanese B. siblings, Wilhelm and Else, had their first difficulty in November 1933 when they were denied student identification cards because of their non-Aryan descent. After several inquiries, they were given the cards in December 1933.

However, both continued to face discrimination. As for Heinz Sch., his marriage to Else B. in December 1933 jeopardized his admission to the medical

143 „Ich schlug vor, ... von jetzt ab alle ähnlichen Anträge (German/Japanese mixed marriages) durch dilatorische Behandlung auf mindestens 1 Jahr zurückzustellen, um alsdann zu Ablehnungen überzugehen. Der Führer stimmte dem zu.“ In a duplicate (Abschrift) signed Dr. Lammers, 21 September 1940. BA Pots: R 43 II/1456a: 9. Dr. Hans Lammers, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, was Hitler’s closest juristic advisor. In Robert Wistrich, Wer war wer im Dritten Reich? (München: Harnack Verlag, 1987) 216.

144 It is possible that there was more competition in the medical field, and Nazi authorities therefore more strictly expelled non-Aryans from this field than from some other fields. In order to come up with a valid explanation, however, one would need to examine more discrimination cases – a worthwhile endeavor for future research.


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internship and license. Fortunately in 1935, both Sch. and Wilhelm B. received official approval for their medical internship as well as a statement from the Ministry of Education (Volksbildungsministerium) that there was no objection to their acquiring medical licenses. The Ministry, however, left open the question of whether they would be permitted to practice medicine – which was to be determined by the Labor Ministry at a later date.\footnote{In letter Mdl / Sch. and W. B., 13 July 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 234.}

In November 1935, Wilhelm B. was again denied a regular-time student’s identification card; instead he was given a „guest“ or foreigner’s status. B. continued to encounter discrimination. The last we hear about him is through a DJG record of January 28, 1941, which discloses that he was denied promotion as a medical officer (Sanitätsoffizier) without any official explanation.\footnote{In letter DJG / AA Herrn Leg. Rat Rohde, 11 November 1934. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 152. In fact, „the whole affair (the denial of promotion) seemed to have been dealt with secretly.“ („Ihm [Wilhelm B.] ist gesagt worden, dass die Angelegenheit [dass B. von der Beförderung zum Sanitätsoffizier der Reserve ausgeschlossen wurde, ohne dass ihm ein Grund hierfür mitgeteilt worden ist] geheim gehandelt würde.“) In the DJG record on Heinz Sch.’s and Wilhelm B.’s visit, 28 January 1941. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 201.}

As for Sch., discrimination next took the form of expulsion from the Nazi party in December 1935. Sch. regarded this incident as seriously tragic because „when one is expelled from the Party, then that signifies a nullification of all successes won in the past regarding this [race] question.“\footnote{„Da es heute als eine sehr ernste Angelegenheit zu betrachten ist, wenn jemand aus der Partei ausgeschlossen wird, würde das gleich bedeutend sein mit einer Annullierung aller bisherigen Erfolge in dieser Frage.“ In letter Sch. / DJG, 29 December 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 226.}

In April 1936 he left his hometown Leipzig to seek advice from the DJG in Berlin, and moreover, filed a complaint with the supreme party court (Oberstes Parteigericht) in Munich. The court advised him in February 1937 not to push them for a decision but instead to wait for the settlement of his case by the relevant authorities.\footnote{In a DJG record of 4 February 1937. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 218.}

Sch.’s letter to the DJG on May 1, 1938 reveals that the court replaced the term „expulsion from the Party“ with a less criminal term, „dismissal“. The Office of the Führer took a harder line, stating that “the marriage with a Japanese was decisive” in the decision to oust him from the Party, especially since the marriage took place after the Nazi rise to power.\footnote{In letter from Langsdorff, Dienststelle des Beauftragten für außenpolitische Fragen der NSDAP im Stabe des Stellvertreters des Führers, to Admiral a.D. Foerster of the DJG, 13 May 1938. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 214. But while Sch. was expelled from the Party for having married a non-Aryan, the Interior Ministry officially claimed in August 1939 that it did not object to Sch.’s position as the editor-in-chief of a medical journal. Nonetheless, Sch. remained pessimistic about his future: as of January 1939, he was concerned that his medical practice might be

denied any time and the offer of a professorship in Berlin might be withdrawn because of his non-Aryan wife.\textsuperscript{151} Similar anxieties were shared by Dr. Ninoske W., who was a half-Japanese German citizen. Although he was able to practice medicine, he was forbidden to join the Nazi party. W. feared that his non-membership would imply a non-Aryan status, thereby jeopardizing his chances of admission into the air force as a medical officer. In fact, he would have to prove his „Deutschblütigkeit“ (Aryan descent) in order to apply for the position. Therefore, W. wanted to have his Aryan status confirmed as soon as possible. He brought his case to the authorities' attention in November 1935 but had not received any answer as of April 1938. In the last recorded letter to W. on April 14, 1938, the DJG wrote that as far as they knew, the Reich authorities still had no definite position regarding the status of Japanese-German individuals.\textsuperscript{152} The continued absence of clear guidelines for Japanese-German discrimination cases was perhaps intentional: given the fact that Japanese-German racial discrimination continued into the 1940s, it was only by not claiming any clear guidelines regarding the Japanese that Nazi authorities ensured their immunity from outright condemnation by the Japanese government and avoided negative diplomatic consequences.

In fact, diplomatic consideration played a major role in the authorities' handling of certain discrimination cases. One such instance involved Professor Iwakura Tomosane, a politically significant Japanese citizen in Heidelberg. He came to Heidelberg University in 1941 to teach the Japanese language. He and his family were treated well by his first host family, which was Jewish. The subsequent host families and landowners took advantage of Iwakura's unfamiliarity with Germany and overcharged him for inadequate housing conditions for a few years. It is unclear whether the discrimination experienced by Iwakura was purely racial or xenophobic, but this distinction is not important for the purpose of examining Nazi Germany's sensitivity to diplomatic implications. The president of the University, who eventually found out about Iwakura's poor treatment after a few years, wrote to the mayor of Heidelberg that something had to be done about this embarrassing situation as soon as possible, given the fact that Iwakura had close contacts with Ambassador Ôshima and was a relative of the Japanese Imperial family.\textsuperscript{153} Therefore in this case, diplomatic expediency was the principal reason for an improved treatment of the Japanese „guest."

Another Japanese citizen, Dr. Miyake Hiroshi, faced a different fate. He came on his own to Kiel in 1932 to receive surgical training under Professor Wil-
helm Anschütz. In 1934, he was required to return to Japan because of the Nazi racial law passed in 1933 which prohibited foreign doctors from treating German patients. Neither Miyake nor many other Japanese doctors who came to Germany before the German-Japanese Cultural Pact of 1938 were affiliated with the Japanese government or with any prominent institution. Apparently, Nazi authorities had no reason not to apply the racial laws to these politically insignificant individuals.

For some victims of discrimination, their livelihood was at risk. Dr. D. suggested that had he not been able to get the permission to work as a health insurance doctor, he would have been unable to support himself and his family. In the case of Georg W., a half-Japanese German citizen who was a magazine artist, the Reich Union of German Press decided in May 1934 that he could not be on the employment list for writers/editors because he was not Aryan. He was further denied a „financial aid for destitute artists“ on the same grounds – his non-Aryan descent. Such official statements confirmed the non-Aryan status of individuals of Japanese descent and clearly refuted the alleged „honorary Aryan“ status of the Japanese.

We have seen from the above examples that the decisions of Nazi authorities regarding institutional discrimination of the Japanese, Japanese-Germans, and their spouses varied from case to case. Heinz Sch. was ousted from the Party because he was married to a „non-Aryan,“ and Georg W. was denied employment because of his „non-Aryan descent.“ On the other hand, Dr. D., whose wife was half-Japanese, was eventually permitted to work in the state-administered health insurance institution – signifying that he was treated as an exception to the racial law which forbade employment in the public sector of those married to „non-Aryans.“ This decision, however, was not accompanied by any official explanation when it was issued by the Labor Ministry. The Interior Min-


It is uncertain, however, whether this phenomenon continued after the German-Japanese Cultural Pact of November 1938, which promoted medical exchanges (i.e. that of medical students) between Japan and Germany. Exchange students (as opposed to private students) most likely enjoyed a special status.


156 „Schliesslich wurde ihm … die finanzielle Beihilfe für mittellose Künstler zwecks Beteili-
gung an einer Bilder-Ausstellung im Hinblick auf seine nichtarische Abstammung verwei-
gert.“ In letter DJG / AA Herrn Leg. Rat Rohde, 11 November 1934. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 152.
Nazi Racism Toward the Japanese

German authorities did not have any official reason for its decision to exempt medical student Mario F. from the racial laws. Neither were there explanations for the approval by the Ministry of Popular Education of a medical internship and license for Heinz Sch., who was married to a half-Japanese German, and for Wilhelm B., a half-Japanese German. At the same time, the same B. was later denied promotion as a medical officer (Sanitätsoffizier) without any official explanation. Thus, the authorities' handling of discrimination cases varied from case to case, and were often arbitrary.

Moreover, although Nazi authorities were concerned with the diplomatic implications of their internationally controversial racial ideology, they continued to discriminate against people of Japanese descent and their spouses. Even racial discrimination which involved politically significant individuals – i.e. the Aoki family and Dr. Iwakura – continued for years. Therefore, although the Nazis compromised their racism in practice by allowing exceptions to the racial laws, their refusal to abandon racial discrimination against the Japanese, Japanese-Germans, and their spouses – despite the clear diplomatic inconvenience of such action – attests to their staunch racism toward all non-Aryans.

* * *

The third category of Nazi racism against people of Japanese descent in Germany involved discrimination in the realm of marriage. We have already seen the Nazi authorities' abhorrence even for a mere social interaction between an „Aryan“ and a „non-Aryan“ – which they condemned as a Rassenschande. One can then speculate as to the Nazis' alarm and outrage regarding „mixed“ marriages.

Five marriage cases involving Japanese-Germans were found in the files of the German-Japanese Society (DJG) alone, while several more were recorded in the files of the Party Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, and Justice Ministry. Although these cases are only a few examples and cannot be said to have been representative of all marriage cases involving Japanese or Japanese-Germans, the different ways in which they were solved offer an invaluable insight into the Nazi attitude toward what was so distastefully called „blood-mixing“ (Blutvermischung) with the Japanese.

The first marriage case in the files of the DJG involved Karl G., a half-Japanese German citizen. Apparently, he had notified the Nazi officials in July 1936 of his desire to marry, but had not received any answer as of September 1937. His letters to the DJG, the Interior Ministry, Dr. Johann von Leers, and Dr. Blome (Chief of the Reich Physicians' League) reveal not only his frustration at the slow process, but also the general uncertainty regarding who was in charge of discrimination cases involving Japanese-Germans. G.'s two trips to Berlin to negotiate with the authorities were fruitless. That his three sisters, all half-

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157 In the DJG record on Heinz Sch.'s and Wilhelm B.’s visit, 28 January 1941. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 201.

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Japanese, were able to marry without any problem – one even married a captain of the German army – seems to have been the major reason for the granting of marriage permission to G.\(^{158}\) We are informed of G's success only through a letter dated July 1939, written by von K. – another Japanese-German individual asking for marriage approval.

Hans-Eckart von K., a half-Japanese German citizen officially ranked as a *japanischer Mischling I. Grades* ("Japanese Mixed-Offspring of the First Degree")\(^ {159}\) faced "enormous difficulties" when he tried to marry in March 1939.\(^ {160}\) In arguing for his case, he referred to § 7 of *I. Ausführungsbestimmungen zum Blutschutzgesetz* ("First Regulation on the Execution of Blood-Protection Law") which stated, according to von K., that only marriages involving blacks or gypsies were prohibited or required official approval.\(^ {161}\) If Japanese-Germans were required to present an *Ehetauglichkeitszeugnis* (certificate of marriageability), then that would mean that the German government considered the Japanese on the same level as blacks and gypsies, wrote von K. He also warned that the Japanese Embassy in Berlin had asked him to inform them on the follow-up of his case – a strategy used by several Japanese-Germans (including Dr. D. and W.) who were aware of the Nazi authorities' concern for the diplomatic implications of Japanese-German discrimination cases.\(^ {162}\)

Furthermore, von K., confused and frustrated, wrote that his uncle in Japan – a general-major of the Japanese army – had been told that the German racial laws did not apply to the Japanese. This, as we may recall, is the notorious rumor of the "honorary Aryan" status of the Japanese. "How can it be that what is said by the German Embassy in Japan is the opposite of what is said in Berlin?" exclaimed von K.\(^ {163}\) Such a statement sums up the Nazi racial policy in regard

\(^{158}\) Secretary von Strobl, who was in charge of discrimination cases involving Japanese-German individuals at the DJG, predicted in September 1937 that Karl G. would be permitted to marry based on the fact that a captain of the German army was allowed to marry G's sister (half-Japanese). BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 289.

\(^{159}\) The ranking of *japanische Mischlinge* referred to the place in the line of descent where the "racial mixing" took place. Those whose parent was Japanese were called *japanische Mischlinge I. Grades*. Those whose grandparent was Japanese were called *japanische Mischlinge II. Grades*.


\(^{161}\) "... die Eheschließung ist weder verboten, noch genehmigungspflichtig, es sei denn, wenn es sich um Neger oder Zigeuner handelt." In letter von K. / DJG, 26 June 1939. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 281.

\(^{162}\) BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 139 (D.), 254 (W.).

\(^{163}\) "Zum Schluss möchte ich Ihnen noch mitteilen, dass mein Onkel (japanischer) Generalmajor Hideo Yaschima, dem ich meine Angelegenheit mitgeteilt habe, sich dahingehend informieren konnte, dass die Japaner nicht durch die deutsche Rassegesetzgebung betroffen werden! Wie kommt es, dass man in Tokio (Deutsche Botschaft) das Gegenteil sagt, was man in Berlin sagt?" Cited in letter von K. / DJG, 10 July 1939. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 279. Emphasis is original.
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...to the Japanese: the Nazis applied their racial laws to people of Japanese descent but denied this fact in Japan to avoid diplomatic friction.

Von K.’s letter to the DJG on July 10, 1939, disclosed that six German-Japanese marriages took place in the year 1937. That Nazi authorities approved any “mixed” marriages reflects their attempt to avoid diplomatic difficulties with Japan. As for von K.’s own case, the DJG files do not make mention of any final decision by the authorities.

A file in the Reich Chancellery contains significant background information regarding Hitler’s perspective on marriages between “Aryan” Germans and Japanese-Germans. On September 21, 1940, Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. Hans Lammers, recorded his conversation with Hitler regarding the case of Hertha Hatsuko F., a japanischer Mischling I. Grades, and Ernst D., an “Aryan” German. During this private meeting, Dr. Lammers convinced Hitler to approve F.’s marriage based on the reasoning that such marriages had been permitted in the past out of diplomatic considerations, and it would be awkward to rule against precedents. Hitler retorted that such marriages should not take place in the future even for diplomatic reasons, because maintaining the purity of the Aryan blood was more important. Dr. Lammers then assured Hitler that after approving the case of D./F., they would postpone other similar cases in order to prevent marriages involving Japanese-Germans without having to issue official disapproval. It is thus clear from this rare and highly significant testament to the perspectives of the dictator and a top Nazi official that diplomatic expediency was an obstacle to the full application of Hitler’s racial ideology, but also that the Nazis obstinately maneuvered to enforce their racial policy as much as possible.

Three years later, in February 1943, Nazi authorities rejected the marriage request of W.L. (Aryan) and U.R. (half-Japanese). Having examined R.’s file in Hamburg’s Gesundheitsamt (Health Office), the Nazis judged it was unlikely that R., “whose physical appearance resembles that of a Malaysian more than a Japanese,” maintained close contacts with her Japanese relatives. Therefore,

164 This information was given to von K. from Toku Baelz – son of the famous physician Professor Erwin Baelz – who was a close friend of the former Japanese Ambassador to Germany Mushakōji. Cited in letter von K. / DJG, 10 July 1939. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 279.

165 She is the same woman who was racially insulted at a dance hall.

166 „Der Führer konnte sich zu der von mir vorgeschlagenen Genehmigung [to approve F.’s marriage] zunächst nicht entschließen und meinte, daß es doch richtiger sei, im Interesse der Reinerhaltung der deutschen Rasse solche Eheschließungen in Zukunft nicht zu gestatten, selbst wenn außenpolitische Gründe für eine Genehmigung sprächen … Ich schlug vor, den Fall […] heute noch zu genehmigen und von jetzt ab alle ähnlichen Anträge durch dilatorische Behandlung auf mindestens 1 Jahr zurückzustellen, um alsdann zu Ablehnungen überzugehen. Der Führer stimmte dem zu.” In a duplicate (Abschrift) signed Dr. Lammers, 21 September 1940. BA Pots R 43 II/1 456a; 9.

167 In notes, „Durchdruck als Konzept,“ Referat D III LS, signed von Hahn, 26 February 1943. AA: R99176 „Eheschließung zwischen Deutschen und fremdrassigen Ausländern.“ („Marriage between Germans and foreigners of foreign races 1940–43.”)
“the refusal to grant a marriage certificate [to R.] would probably neither provoke an outcry in the Japanese public, nor have negative consequences on German-Japanese relations.”¹⁶⁸ Such thorough research on a victims' personal background testifies to the Nazis' meticulous efforts to promote their racist principle, as this Nazi 'researcher' who reported on R.' case stated: „Marriage between Aryans and half-Japanese mixed offsprings are, in terms of racial politics, fundamentally undesirable.“¹⁶⁹

Finally, the case of Hans F., a half-Japanese German citizen who requested marriage recognition in Kôbe, Japan, in February 1939 offers an important insight into Nazi racial policy regarding Japanese-Germans. This case was not like many other marriage cases examined above in that the marriage had already occurred in Japan, and that no „pure Aryan“ was involved. More specifically, the marriage took place at the registry office in Kôbe on February 15, 1939 between F. and Japanese citizen Masae M. The Japanese law permitted the marriage with a foreigner provided that the foreigner's country did not object to it. Apparently, the law was not too strictly enforced since F.'s verbal statement of Germany's approval of his marriage was considered sufficient by the registry office of Kôbe.¹⁷⁰ The „undesirability“ of F.'s marriage with a fully Japanese individual was not disputed by the German government. The Consulate mentioned that out of about 600 Germans living in all German colonies outside of Germany, 23 had Japanese wives, 6 had half-Japanese wives, resulting in 48 half-Japanese and 14 quarter-Japanese children. With F.'s marriage, „there is reason for further anxiety.“¹⁷¹ The General Consulate of Ôsaka wrote, however, that marriage prohibition implied by 1. Ausführungsverordnung zum Blutschutzgesetz (Regulation on the Execution of Blood-Protection Law)¹⁷² was „not absolute“ and moreover „cannot nullify a marriage that had already taken place.“¹⁷³ Furthermore, the Consulate had no legal power to prevent German

¹⁶⁸ „Die Versagung des Ehetauglichkeitszeugnisses wird daher voraussichtlich weder Auswirkungen auf die japanische Öffentlichkeit noch auf die deutsch-japanischen Beziehungen haben.“ In „Durchdruck als Konzept,“ signed von Hahn, 26 February 1943. AA: R99176.

¹⁶⁹ In „Durchdruck als Konzept,“ Referat D III LS, signed von Hahn, 26 February 1943. AA: R99176.

¹⁷⁰ In a letter to the Interior Ministry on March 14, 1941, the German Foreign Ministry complained that only in exceptional cases did the local Japanese registry offices demand German consulate certification of marriageability. AA: R99176.


¹⁷² Refer to Chapter Two, pages 44–45 for details.

citizens from marrying Japanese citizens. Even if it had had such power, exercising it would have been an offense to Japanese „racial pride“.\footnote{Andererseits haben die hiesigen Konsulatsbehörden z. Zt. noch keine rechtliche Möglichkeit, den Abschluss solcher Ehen zu verhindern … Es müsste daher eine grundsätzliche Regelung getroffen werden. Ich darf der dortigen Erwägung anheim stellen, wie eine solche Regelung zu erreichen wäre. Nach hiesiger Auffassung müsste der japanische Rassenstolz und die japanische Empfindlichkeit dabei geschont werden.” Cited in letter DB / AA, re: Mischehen zwischen Deutschen und Japanern (“Mixed marriages between Germans and Japanese”), 27 February 1939. BA Kobl: R 22 465; 95.}

The case of F. therefore attests to the near impossibility of a full application of the Nazi racial laws on Germans living in Japan. The German government could have told Japanese registry offices to demand an official, written marriage approval of the German government when marrying German citizens in Japan. However, the Ōsaka Consulate wanted to avoid any discussion that hinged on the race issue for fear of offending the Japanese public, and thereby creating diplomatic frictions. Moreover, F.’s case forced the authorities to recognize the limitations on the application of the racial laws abroad.

Although the German Consulate in Ōsaka realized its lack of authority regarding „mixed“ marriages, practically nothing was done to enable the Consulate to prevent such „unwanted“ marriages in the future. The Consulate merely decided to „verbally instruct“ Germans who wanted to marry Japanese by educating them on the Reich’s official stance on „mixed“ marriages, and if they still insisted on marriage, to warn them that their Japanese spouses would not be entitled to German passports. Such „new rules“ seem questionable in light of the Consulate's decision to grant F.’s Japanese wife a German passport, and the eventual recognition of their marriage in April 1940 based on the reason that „it seemed not expedient to refuse to recognize the marriage …“\footnote{Nach Lage des Falles erscheint es nicht zweckmäßig, die von einem japanischen Standesbeamten vorgenommene Eheschließung des deutschen Staatsangehörigen F. mit der Volljapanerin Maruo die Anerkennung zu versagen.” Cited in letter Rdl / AA, 29 April 1940. BA Kobl: R 22 465; 114.} Although F.’s marriage was eventually officially recognized, the fact that his case was examined so carefully for more than a year by the German Consulate in Ōsaka, the German Embassy in Tôkyô, the German Foreign Ministry, and by the Justice Ministry reveals the Nazis' insistence on the application of racial laws even outside of Germany.

There were probably many more marriage requests from individuals of Japanese descent whose cases were examined by authorities other than the DJG, Party Chancellery, and Foreign Ministry. Perhaps one such case was that of Tanaka Michiko, a famous Japanese singer and actress, and Victor de Kowa, a prominent German actor to whom the Nazi regime even bestowed the title of a „state actor.“ Despite the fact that the Nazis wished particularly to discourage prominent Germans from intermarriage, Tanaka – a Japanese citizen – and De
Kowa finally married in August 1941 in Berlin. How and why they were able to marry remains a mystery. According to one source, Kuwaki Tsutomu, then an exchange student sent by the Japanese government in 1939 to Berlin (as a result of the German-Japanese Cultural Pact of November 1938), the reason why Tanaka was able to marry De Kowa „seems to have been the semi-Aryan (jun-äria jin) status of the Japanese.“ Kuwaki's speculative reasoning indicates the interesting possibility that the rumor of the „honorary Aryan“ status of the Japanese had transformed into that of the „semi-Aryan“ status by 1941. However, this was probably not the true reason for Nazi authorities' approval of Tanaka's marriage. Given the prominence of Tanaka in the Japanese community in Germany as well as in Japan, the Nazis probably speculated that a denial of her marriage would be widely publicized, and therefore would have an adverse effect on German-Japanese relations. In any case, De Kowa's marriage to Tanaka became big news and a topic for discussion by the general public in Berlin. Apparently, the couple continued to face problems of discrimination after their marriage, although the details are not known.

Another marriage case which was not recorded by the DJG, Party Chancellery, or Foreign Ministry involved Sasamoto Shunji, a Japanese journalist from Japan, who wanted to marry an Aryan German citizen in Germany. He recalls that after his request had been denied in Berlin in 1938, he went to several other places including Budapest and Vienna, but without luck. Only in 1943 when he finally managed to meet with a Nazi official through personal connection and bribed him with a bottle of whisky, was he granted permission to marry. Given the highly arbitrary and unethical way in which Sasamoto's case was resolved, it would not be surprising if Nazi authorities did not officially record this case.

* * *

We have so far focused on the Nazi authorities' reactions and decisions regarding various Japanese-German discrimination cases. It is equally significant and revealing to study these cases from the victims' perspectives. The victims' entreaties to authorities for exemption from discriminatory treatment reveal several common arguments of self-defense. One recurring feature in the victims' letters – as Nami Ohtomo points out – is their attempts to assert their German-ness. For instance, Hilde O. wrote on behalf of her Japanese mother and herself:

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179 Unfortunately, Tsunoda does not specify obstacles that Tanaka and De Kowa confronted.
180 Interview with Mr. Sasamoto Shunji, July 8, 1995 in Bonn, Germany.
It is known that we have both voted national socialist since 1925. Almost all of my acquaintances belong to the party and its organizations. We were the only inhabitants of the eastern quarter of the local city who in 1930 (during the time of the uniform ban) hung the flag outside during a procession of the SA. For that, we also have witnesses.\footnote{Wir haben beide seit 1925 nationalsozialistisch gewählt, dieses ist bekannt. Fast meine sämtlichen Bekannten gehören der Partei und deren Gliederungen an. Wir waren die einzigen Bewohner im Ostviertel der hiesigen Stadt, die 1930 (in der Zeit des Uniformverbotes) bei einem Umzuge der SA die Fahne herausgehängt haben. Auch dafür haben wir Zeugen.“ In letter O. / DJG, 5 January 1936. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 115. Also cited in OHTOMO 64. (The English translation is Ohtomo’s.)}

Heinz Sch. explained that his half-Japanese wife „was raised completely as a German and she feels North-German in her language, personality, and sensibilities or feelings (Empfindungsleben).“\footnote{ „…, dass meine Frau nicht etwa als Ausländerin, sondern vollkommen als Deutsche erzogen worden ist und nach Sprache, Charakter und Empfindungsleben sich ganz als Norddeutsche fühlt.“ In letter Sch. / DJG, 25 March 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 242. Also cited in OHTOMO 64. (The English translation is Ohtomo’s.)} Ernst T. gave a detailed report on his half-Japanese wife’s family, whose members had fought for Germany in World War I and worked for the Red Cross, among other things. Some Japanese-Germans wanted to prove their Germanness to the extent that they were apologetic about their Japanese descent. Fritz B., Wilhelm B.’s father, wrote, „Since race questions had played no role, I could not have guessed at the time of my marriage that my children would later face difficulties.\footnote{ „Da zu jener Zeit die Rassenfrage noch keine Rolle spielte, konnte ich bei Eingehung dieser Ehe nicht ahnen, dass meinen Kindern daraus später einmal Schwierigkeiten in ihrem Fortkommen entstehen könnten.“ In letter Fritz B. / DJG, 25 March 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 243–245. Also cited in OHTOMO 65. (The English translation is Ohtomo’s.)}

Several went further than merely emphasizing their Germanness: they tried to prove their „Naziness“ by using pro-Nazi or anti-Semitic arguments. T. ended this letter of plight to the Foreign Ministry with: „As ardent champion of the present regime, I ask that my request be granted. Heil Hitler!“\footnote{ „…, dass meine Frau nicht etwa als Ausländerin, sondern vollkommen als Deutsche erzogen worden ist und nach Sprache, Charakter und Empfindungsleben sich ganz als Norddeutsche fühlt.“ In letter Sch. / DJG, 25 March 1935. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 242. Also cited in OHTOMO 64. (The English translation is Ohtomo’s.)} O. set forth her interpretation of the racial laws: „It has always been: one should fight the Jews. It has never been: fight the non-Aryans.“\footnote{„Es hiess doch damals stets, dass man den Juden bekämpfen solle. Es hiess doch niemals: Kampf dem Nichtarier.“ In letter O. / DJG, 5 January 1936.} Apparently, she used Jews as a scapegoat. The individuals of Japanese descent who faced discrimination generally come across as indifferent to or supportive of antisemitism in their letters. Their use of antisemitism was clearly an attempt to curry favor with Nazi authorities, although one can by no means rule out the possibility that the victims were truly anti-Semitic.

Japanese citizens in Germany who were not subjected to racial discrimination also seem to have been indifferent or even receptive to Nazi antisemitism. In 1933, Curt F. was denied admission to the DJG because a Japanese had al-
legedly (and falsely) reported to the DJG president that he was Jewish. Mrs. Hattori, the wife of a businessman who worked in the Mitsubishi Berlin office from 1936 to 1945, stated that her husband was indoctrinated with antisemitism during these years. The DJG itself – the mediator of many Japanese-German discrimination cases – ousted its Jewish president, Dr. Wilhelm Haas, in April 1933. And as Curt F.’s case showed, the DJG did not accept new Jewish members.

In addition to emphasizing their Germanness, or „Naziness“ in some cases, several victims contested their non-Aryan status. For instance, Hanna Hatzfeldt-Aoki wrote: „I have heard from various sources that following a certain incident, … the government has issued a formal decree in which all Japanese and their offspring would be considered ‚honorary Aryans‘ …“ Similar hearsay was voiced by von K. Nevertheless, various case studies have already shown that Japanese-Germans faced discrimination because of their non-Aryan status.

It was in Japan that Nazi authorities told the public that the Japanese were considered not „non-Aryan.“ D. referred to a speech given in Tôkyô by Dr. Kolb, a legation councillor, stating: The term, „Aryan“, … simply meant: non-Jewish! […] the National Socialism has permitted its Party members to have an East Asian for a wife. This important decision was made in November 1933. […] Germany is only concerned with the Jews.

No other primary or secondary source confirmed the existence of the alleged „decision“ permitting Nazi Party members to marry Asians. On the contrary, the experiences of Ernst T. and Hans Sch. showed that Germans who married non-Aryans could be prohibited from joining the Party or be expelled from it. The contradiction is obvious: what was being claimed in Japan was the opposite of what was really happening in Germany.

186 DJG (Hack) F., 5.12.1933, BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 284.
187 In interview with Günther Haasch, President of the DJG, in July 1995 in Berlin. Also indicated by the DJG Findbuch, p.OHTOMO 11. BA Kobl: R 64 IV.
188 „Ich hörte von verschiedenen Seiten, dass die Reichsregierung nach einem Zwischenfall … eine formelle Bestimmung erlassen habe, in welcher alle Japaner und deren Nachkommen als ‚Ehren Arier‘ … gälten.“ In letter Hatzfeldt-Aoki / DJG Dr. Hack, 20 April 1934. BA Kobl: R 64 IV/31; 101 (emphasis is original).
Most likely, the „incident“ she referred to was the discrimination faced by Takenouchi's daughter in 1933; and „a formal decree“ was von Neurath’s official apology and assurances regarding the „non-colored“ status of the Japanese.
189 Refer to page 58 above.
The various discrimination cases – public humiliation, institutional discrimination, and marriage prohibition – revealed the inefficient and often arbitrary ways in which the Nazi authorities dealt with the *Rassenfrage* regarding Japanese, German-Japanese, and their spouses. For most victims, the decisions were slow to come. Often, no official explanation accompanied the decisions when they were finally issued. Some cases remained unresolved. The slow and arbitrary decision-making processes resulted from the authorities' uncertainty as to who was officially in charge of this particular *Rassenfrage*, and moreover, from their disagreements regarding the extent to which the racial laws should be applied to the Japanese.

This general ambiguity regarding the racial discrimination against the Japanese resulted from the interplay between the the Nazis' concern for German-Japanese diplomatic relations and their obstinate insistence on racial ideology. The Nazi authorities' interest in maintaining a healthy diplomatic relationship with Japan, as we have seen, did not allow them to fully enforce their racial laws on the Japanese. At the same time, the diplomatic *Realpolitik* was not so significant as to exempt the Japanese as a “race” from the racial laws.

One way that the Nazis coped with this dilemma between diplomatic expediency and racial ideology was by implementing racism at home while telling otherwise to the Japanese government. It was this duplicitous practice that gave rise to the fictitious “honorary Aryan” status of the Japanese. Not surprisingly, several victims picked up on this discrepancy between what was really happening in Germany and what was being claimed in Japan.

Most likely, Nazi authorities attributed increasing importance to their diplomatic interests in the later years of the German-Japanese alliance. The majority of the cases that were prolonged into the late 1930s and early 1940s were either resolved in the victims' favor or never. But the fact remains that discrimination against individuals of Japanese descent and their spouses continued to take place when such discrimination posed no direct threat to German-Japanese relations. In fact, one may recall that the overwhelming majority of the reported marriage cases were dated after 1936 – after the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936.

What is amazing is how zealously Nazi Germany tried to avoid compromising their racial ideology despite the certainty of its diplomatic inconvenience. Nazi authorities conducted substantial research on racial and family backgrounds of the victims in order to determine the diplomatic significance of every single case under examination. An enormous amount of paperwork involved in the case studies alone attests to the Nazis' determination to exalt the „Aryan race“ and to protect it from „pollution“ by „the Japanese race.“ In sum, racial ideology was such a preeminent pillar of the Nazi regime that the Nazis refused to abandon their racism toward the Japanese, no matter how illogical and inconvenient it was to Germany's relations with Japan.
Guidelines and Abbreviations

The Nazi terminology – i.e. “mixed offspring,” “racially inferior,” – is set off by quotation marks as much as possible. Frequently used words such as “Aryan” and “non-Aryan” are not always written between quotation marks. It must be emphasized that they are Nazi terms; by no means do they reflect the ideas of the author of this thesis.

All German words and citations have been italicized. Emphasized words (originally underlined or italicized) in the original German text have been emphasized by spacing. Page numbers for primary sources have been indicated for those documents which were paginated.

AA Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry). AA is also used as an abbreviation for the German Foreign Ministry Archives (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts).

AO Auslandsorganisation (International Organization of the NSDAP)

BA Kobl Bundesarchiv Koblenz (German National Archives in Koblenz)

BA Pots Bundesarchiv Abteilung Potsdam (Potsdam Branch of the German National Archives)

DB Deutsche Botschaft Tôkyô (German Embassy in Tôkyô)

MdI Reichsinnenministerium (Reich Ministry of Interior)

MdJ Reichsjustizministerium (Reich Ministry of Justice)

P-kanz Partei-Kanzlei: refers to the microfilmed files of Party Chancellery at the Institute for Research on Anti-Semitism (Institut für Antisemitismusforschung in Berlin)

RA Rassenpolitisches Amt des NSDAP (Racial Policy Office)

Rdl Reichsminister des Innern (Reich Minister of Interior)

RdJ Reichsminister der Justiz (Reich Minister of Justice)

Rk Reichskanzlei (Reich Chancellery)

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VI. French Text

Deutsch-Japaner in Japan

„Als Mischling hatte U. in Deutschland keine Chancen in seinem Beruf (er war Botaniker und Spezialist für Kartoffelkultur), und so wurde er Deutschlehrer an einer Schule in Japan, wogegen er seinem japanischen Aussehen zum Trotz Japanisch erst lernen mußte. Die Tragikomödie dieses Ehepaars war, daß es die deutsch-japanische Freundschaft verkörperte und eben deshalb zwischen zwei Stühlen saß, zwischen Japanern und Deutschen, von denen keiner sie für voll nahm.“


„Anfang 1928 kam die junge Frau Balz mit ihrem 7–8 jährigen Sohn nach Tôkyô, um das Geburtsland ihre Mannes, Toku Bälz [Sohn des bekannten Arztes Erwin Bälz und seiner japanischen Frau], kennenzulernen. […] Die junge Frau kam oft zu uns, klagte ihr Leid, brachte die blechernen Spielzeuge, die ihr Bub von der Großmutter bekommen hatte, unserem Paul mit, weil sie viel zu kindisch und wertlos für ihren Sohn waren, der einmal zu ihr gesagt habe: „ich schneide mir noch die Ader auf, daß alles japanische Blut herausläuft.“ […]

Im Sommer mietete Herr Bälz ein großes Haus in Karuizawa. Da waren wir einen Abend eingeladen. Er las uns das Bekenntnis eines Menschen vor, der mit der Zwiespältigkeit seiner Herkunft – deutscher Vater, japanische Mutter – nicht fertig wurde, bis er durch die Liebe eines deutschen Mädchens endlich zur Ruhe kam. Es war eine ergreifende und seine eigene Geschichtete.“


Mädel nun bei uns ein – nach Auffassung der Rassenfrage? Da ist noch vieles ungeklärt. Wiederum sind sie vom Asiatentum innerlich auch so weit entfernt, dass man sie nicht einfach fallen lassen kann und sagen „Ihr gehört zu Japan“. Und auch der Japaner sagt ja: „Nur ein Halber!“ Ausserdem sind die Kinder Reichsdeutsche. […] Wohl ist unsere grundsätzliche Einstellung zu der Rassenmischung zwischen Japanern und Europäern klar, noch nicht aber unsere Stellung zu den Halblutkindern, die nun mal da sind.“

„Aus dem 9. Rundbrief des DAKP vom 15.7.1941“, BA Kohl R57 neu

„Doch wie diese politisch inspirierte Freundschaft zwischen Deutschland und Japan die natürlich gewachsene überlagerte, kam es auch im engeren Bereich der Schule bei der formalen Anwendung innerdeutscher Praktiken zu manchmal grotesken Erscheinungen, wenn z.B. im Zusammenhang mit der Rassentheorie jener Tage im Biologieunterricht die Höherwertigkeit blond und blauäugiger Menschen vor Schülern gelehrt werden sollte, deren Mutter eine Japanerin war. Folgende Episode ist überliefert:

„Die Lehrerin hatte gerade das Kapitel über die Rassenlehre der Nazis begonnen. In meiner Klasse waren aber besonders viele Jungen und Mädchen mit japanischen Müttern. So bekam die brave Pädagogin, als sie die Vorzüge der nordischen Rasse erläutern sollte, einen immer rötener Kopf und verhedderte sich schließlich hoffnungslos. Da übersprang sie die fraglichen 30 Seiten und ging zum nächsten Thema über."

So wie man die halb heitere, halb ernsthafte Praktik zu Beginn der dreißiger Jahre, nämlich ein in der Schule gesprochenes japanisches Wort mit einer kleinen Geldbuße zu ahnden, bald aufgegeben hatte, wurde manches Element der NS-Ideologie vor den Augen der Schülerchaft in der Deutschen Schule Kobe, die eben nicht nur helle und trotzigermanische, sondern auch dunkle und höfliche asiatische Züge aufwies, ad absurdum geführt.“